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Music at the Edge of Chaos:
A Complex Systems Perspective on File Sharing
Deborah Tussey*
I. INTRODUCTION
The twin developments of digital copying and global networking
technologies have drastically transformed the information environment
and have produced particularly acute dislocations in the music recording
industry. The perceived threat to the industry posed by peer-to-peer
(P2P) file sharing has inspired numerous proposals for legislative
action, many involving major adjustments to or even abandonment of
the copyright regime. Contemporary file sharing arose in the context of
a system designed to produce and distribute musical recordings. This
article approaches the issue of file sharing regulation' by applying
complexity theory and related principles of systems analysis to that
system.
Systems both occur naturally and result from human design.2
Complexity theory provides a conceptual model for a particular
category of systems---complex adaptive systems 3-and their evolution
* Associate Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law. Thanks to Sam Lupica and to
participants in the 2004 Works-in-Progress IP Colloquium at Boston University and the 2005 IP
& Communications Law and Policy Scholars Roundtable at Michigan State University-DCL
College of Law, for their comments on earlier versions of this article. The writing of this article
was supported by a grant from the Kerr Foundation and Law Alumni Fund.
1. This article focuses on federal regulation through the U.S. copyright regime. International
regulation falls outside the scope of the article except insofar as U.S. regulation will inevitably
have transborder effects.
2. "[Flor reasons not yet explained, phenomena order themselves largely as discrete systems."
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 483 (1997). A
system is an aggregation of two or more inter-related, interacting elements or components that
comprise a unified whole. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1269 (1 1th ed.
2003) (expanding the basic definition of "system" to a variety of contexts including, for example,
thermodynamic systems; systems of body organs; networks; social, economic, and political
organizations; and conceptual systems). This article focuses on complex adaptive systems, which
are open, dynamic, nonlinear systems and may be either physical or conceptual.
3. Writers vary somewhat in their use of the terminologies "complex system" or "complex
adaptive system" to describe nonlinear, dynamical systems that produce emergent behaviors
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over time. Building on chaos theory, complexity theorists in both the
hard and soft sciences have sought to identify fundamental
characteristics of complex systems as diverse as the global environment,
the human brain, nation states and tribal organizations, free market
economies and stock markets.4  Complexity theory suggests that
complex adaptive systems, regardless of their particular subject matters,
universally exhibit certain characteristics, of which the most critical is
self-organization or emergence. Within such systems, unexpected
system-wide behavioral patterns "emerge" from the predictable local
interactions of the system's constituent elements, facilitating adaptation
to changes in the surrounding environment.5 The most successful
systems maintain a state poised between total order and complete
chaos-a position "at the edge of chaos"-which provides the system
with the flexibility necessary to adapt to change.
Theories derived from the study of computer models6 or natural
phenomena do not always provide a one-to-one correspondence to
human systems.7 Nonetheless, complexity theories, in combination with
systems analysis,8 have produced useful models of evolutionary change
enabling adaptation to changing circumstances. In this article, the terms are used
interchangeably.
4. There is considerable overlap between the fields of chaos and complexity theory. Both deal
with nonlinear, dynamical systems. As a rule of thumb, chaos theorists may focus more on the
divergent behaviors that can result from deterministic rules, while complexity theorists
concentrate on the universal patterns of behavior, including chaotic behavior, displayed by
complex systems. Complexity theory subsumes chaos theory and the definitional borders
between the two remain somewhat hazy. See ROGER LEWIN, COMPLEXITY: LIFE AT THE EDGE OF
CHAOS 10-13 (1992) (discussing the overlap between chaos and complexity). Some writers tend
to use the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Andrew W. Hayes, An Introduction to Chaos and
Law, 60 UMKC L. REV. 751, 756 (1992), who introduces his discussion of chaos theory thus:
"Chaos is about complexity .... " For engaging, readable accounts of the development of these
fields, see also JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987) (discussing the science
of chaos); M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF
ORDER AND CHAOS (1992) (discussing the development of complexity and chaos theory).
5. The characteristics of complex systems, including emergence and positioning at the "edge
of chaos" are fully defined and explored infra Part II.
6. The development of computers powerful enough to create artificial complex systems, such
as cellular automata, or to simulate real systems like the weather, was critical to the development
of complexity theory, and many of its principle tenets derive from computer models. See
WALDROP, supra note 4, at 63-64 (discussing the impact of computers on the study of complex
systems).
7. Some controversy remains over the extent to which science-based theories can be directly
applied to subjects such as the rise and fall of social systems. See, e.g., JOHN L. CASTI,
COMPLEXIFICATION: EXPLAINING A PARADOXICAL WORLD THROUGH THE SCIENCE OF
SURPRISE 77-84 (1994) (describing the controversy over the applicability of mathematical
catastrophe theory, an aspect of complexity theory, to biological and social systems).
8. While complexity theory offers insight into the behaviors of complex systems, systems
analysis provides a methodology for studying them. A systems approach requires that observers
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in political, economic, technological, socio-cultural, and legal systems.9
Whether one considers the complexity model to be directly applicable
or merely a helpful analogy or metaphor, it offers a framework through
which the controversy over music file sharing can be viewed with fresh
eyes.
The system for producing and distributing music recordings (the
music system) can be described as a complex adaptive system in which
legal, political, economic, socio-cultural, and technological subsystems
converge, interact, and coevolve. Digitization and global networking
introduced disruptive perturbations into the workings of this system,
requiring an evolutionary response to the new environment.
Complexity theory predicts that new models of information creation and
analyze each system holistically by defining and evaluating the functionality of the entire system,
rather than reductively by examining only its components. Systems analysis accommodates
complexity, providing a comprehensive analysis of system function by defining the system,
discovering its goals, and evaluating whether it achieves them. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at
481. Complexity theory fundamentally assumes a systems approach. There is considerable
overlap between general systems theory and complexity theory.
9. See, e.g., PER BAK, How NATURE WORKS: THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANIZED
CRITICALITY (1996) (applying self-organized criticality to natural phenomena); ROBERT JERVIS,
SYSTEM EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE (1997) (applying complexity
theory to social science and political theory); STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED
LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE (2001) (discussing emergence theory); Stuart
Kauffman, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND
COMPLEXITY (1995) (discussing spontaneous order and self-organization and the effect on
ecosystems, economic systems, and cultural systems); W. Brian Arthur, Complexity and the
Economy, 284 SCIENCE 107, 107-109 (1999), (discussing complexity theory in the economic
context). A number of legal scholars have applied aspects of chaos and complexity theories to
legal theory in general and to specific legal disciplines. See Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of
Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science, Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 942-
75 (1994) (discussing the application of chaos theory to the law in theoretical terms); David G.
Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long is the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature
of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545 (2000) (discussing complexity theory); Mark J. Roe,
Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 641-68 (1996) (discussing
chaos theory, path dependence, and modem evolution theory as applied to law and economics); J.
B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-And-Society System: A Wake-
Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modem Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 849-
928 (1996) [hereinafter Ruhl, Complexity] (discussing the role of complexity in the interaction
between law and society); Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 329, 329-51 (1993) (discussing chaos theory as a viable option for solving the
justice paradox). Legal scholars have also applied complexity theory to specific legal disciplines.
See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 603, 603-52 (2003) (applying complexity theory to broadcast flag mandates); David G. Post
& David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing On Every Continent": Towards a New Theory of
Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998)
(applying chaos theory to cyberspace governance); J. B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as
a Complex Adaptive System: How To Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of
Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. REV. 933, 933-1002 (1997) [hereinafter Ruhl, Thinking]
(applying complexity theory to environmental law).
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dissemination will naturally emerge over time from the millions of
individual interactions among users and providers of content and digital
technologies. P2P file sharing is one such emergent behavior. It has
fed back into the music system and has produced emergent responses in
the form of new online business models.W These recent developments
suggest that the music system is adapting successfully to the digital
environment.
Nonetheless, the current political climate appears to favor legislative
intervention, and many proposals are under discussion in Congress,
within academia and in the media. This article argues that legislators
should approach legal regulation of the music system cautiously to
avoid rendering the system unsustainable by depriving it of the
flexibility needed to adapt to changing circumstances.
Part II of this article outlines the characteristics of complex adaptive
systems." Part III demonstrates that the music system displays those
characteristics and may be adapting to the P2P phenomenon. There is,
to date, little empirical support for claims that the system is at risk.1
2
The availability of empirical evidence, however, often bears an inverse
relationship to the likelihood of legislative intervention. Consequently,
Part IV suggests a few general principles which may be useful to
regulators of the music system, noting the importance of personal uses. 3
Part V then briefly analyzes several proposed models for regulating the
music system and concludes that all of them fail to allow the system
reasonable time to adapt without further legislative intervention. 14
Part VI proposes that the current regulatory structure be left
essentially unaltered for approximately three years.'5 During that
period, regulators should monitor the system to assure that system
conditions encourage open competition in online distribution. Further,
independent observers should perform a comprehensive system analysis
to establish whether any legislative intervention is, in fact, necessary. If
empirical analysis indicates that legislation is needed, the most
successful legislative strategies will be those which recognize that
unpredictable, sometimes disruptive, change is not only inevitable, but
advantageous to the system. Regulators should employ multiple
10. Notably, Apple iTunes and similar online music services, which are facilitated by flexible
digital rights management systems.
11. See infra Part II (providing background on complexity theory and complex adaptive
systems).
12. See infra Part III (applying a systems approach to the music system).
13. See infra Part IV (suggesting legislative strategy to regulate the complex music system).
14. See infra Part V (applying suggested strategy to current reform proposals).
15. See infra Part VI (discussing the wait-and-see approach).
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strategies over a period of years to keep the system in balance as it
completes the transition to the online environment. In short, the legal
regime should nudge the music system toward the edge of chaos where
the productive interplay between order and disorder will keep the
system poised for long term, sustainable growth.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS
A brief foray into the basic concepts of complexity theory is an
obvious prerequisite to application of those concepts to the music
system. 16  Complexity theory posits that complex adaptive systems
universally possess certain characteristics: they are composed of
multiple, interconnected components; change cascades through them in
a nonlinear manner; they evolve and coevolve over time in a pattern of
punctuated equilibrium; and they produce emergent behaviors. These
qualities make system behavior unpredictable over the long term and,
where humans intervene in such systems, their actions are likely to
produce unintended consequences. The most robust systems exhibit a
property sometimes referred to as self-organizing criticality or
positioning at the "edge of chaos"-the ability to maintain a productive
internal tension between order and chaos. 17
A. Multiple, Interconnected Components
Complex systems contain many diverse components. A market
economy, for example, includes a variety of business and regulatory
organizations, as well as individual producers, sellers, and consumers.
Complex systems often "nest" within each other, which is to say that the
components of the primary system under observation are themselves
16. The relevance of these concepts to the music system will become apparent in Part III and
the reader's indulgence is requested.
17. See LEWIN, supra note 4, at 44-62 (discussing the edge of chaos). The following
discussion is drawn from several sources that use variable terminologies to characterize complex
adaptive systems. Compare, e.g., Crawford, supra note 9, at 622 (summarizing the characteristics
of such systems as irreversibility, stability, bifurcation, and symmetry breaking) with Ruhl,
Thinking, supra note 9, at 939 (listing the key properties as "the aggregation of a system's many
component parts; ... the dissipative flow of energy, information, or other mediums through the
system;.., the nonlinear path of system evolution; ... the diversity of system components and
behavior; and ... self-critical behavior... "). See generally WALDROP, supra note 4, at 11-12
(discussing complex adaptive systems); JERVIS, supra note 9, at 5-21 (describing characteristics
of complex systems). To some extent, these variations result from the interdisciplinary nature of
complexity studies. Arthur, supra note 9, at 108 (observing that "[w]hat economists call multiple
equilibria, non-predictability, lock-in, inefficiency, historical path dependence, and asymmetry;
physicists call multiple meta-stable states, unpredictability, phase- or mode-locking, high-energy
ground states, non-ergodicity, and symmetry breaking"). Despite the variable terminologies,
there is general consensus on the essential properties of complex adaptive systems.
2005]
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complex systems that, in turn, contain other complex systems. For
example, the business organizations nested within a market economy
are complex systems comprised of individual human beings, each of
whom is a complex system consisting of interrelated complex systems
including the brain, other organs, nervous and endocrine systems, and
so on. Consequently, a particular actor, whether individual or
institutional, may be simultaneously involved in many systems.
Complex systems contain rich interconnections among components
that facilitate the transfer of information, money, products, energy,
matter, or whatever medium flows through the system.18 While most
interactions between system components occur locally between
"neighbors," the interconnections assure that information flows
throughout the system, often being modified along the way.' 9
Consequently, if a perturbation sparks change at one point, the effects
propagate throughout the system and often trigger cascades of further
change. In some cases, components of the system may be
interdependent, so that change in one component requires or constrains
change in others. 20  The complicated structure of the system thus
contributes to its nonlinear behavior.
B. Nonlinearity
Complex adaptive systems are dynamic and always in process.2' In
linear systems, as processes occur, effects will be proportional to
causes. In nonlinear systems, on the other hand, causes do not produce
proportional effects. Single causes may produce multiple effects. A
small stimulus may cause a large effect or no effect at all.22 In complex
adaptive systems, processes unfold according to predictable local rules,
but tend to form feedback loops and respond to certain "attractors" in
the system, producing nonlinear behavior of the system as a whole over
time.
At the local level, system components interact in accordance with
rules that are often simple and deterministic. In the short term, these
rules produce relatively predictable behaviors. For example, market
18. Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 947.
19. See LEWIN, supra note 4, at 12-13 (describing the process of emergence); JOHNSON,
supra note 9, at 74-78 (describing how local interactions in ant colonies produce emergent
behavior).
20. See JERVIS, supra note 9, at 21-22 (noting that such interdependence is common in both
biological and technological systems).
21. Arthur, supra note 9, at 107.
22. See JERVIS, supra note 9, at 34-39 (discussing the need to comprehend systems through
the nonlinear interactions of their variables).
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actors follow rules set by the laws of property and contract, as well as
by commercial practices and norms, and the results of their actions in
individual cases, and in the short term, are fairly predictable. However,
the aggregation of activities following those rules often creates feedback
loops.23 In a rising stock market, for example, the assumption that
further rises will occur creates positive feedback that encourages more
investment, but the increasing cost of shares produces negative
24feedback that deters some investors. In this way, the effects of an
actor's behavior feed back to that actor and affect its future behavior;
the effects of change within one system may both feed back within that
system and cause change in interacting systems, which then feeds back
to the primary system.25 The likelihood of feedback loops appearing in
a given system correlates with the degree of interconnectedness in the
system. Denser interconnections create more feedback 6
Complexity theorists believe that dynamic systems also respond to
"attractors"-states to which the system is inherently drawn and which
affect its trajectory over time. 7 Systems may contain more than one
23. "Feedback" is information returned to the source of an action, event, or process.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 459 (11 th ed. 2003). Such information follows
a circuitous path referred to as a loop. Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 948. For examples of
feedback in complex systems, see JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 130-162. Positive feedback occurs
when change in one direction sets in motion reinforcing pressures that produce further change in
the same direction. Network effects, in which the value of a good or service increases as more
people use it, are a form of positive feedback. Negative feedback occurs when change triggers
forces that counteract the initial change and return the system to something like its original
position, attempting to keep the system in a stable condition known as homeostasis. A thermostat
that responds to a change in temperature by turning the heating and cooling system on or off to
maintain a constant temperature is a negative feedback device. Negative feedback is essential for
stability, positive feedback for change and growth. Positive and negative feedback loops may
operate simultaneously, or sequentially. For example, an arms race is a positive feedback loop
(each side continues to escalate) that may produce a negative feedback effect if the race prevents
war and prevents either side from achieving dominance. In some cases, it may be difficult to
characterize feedback loops as either positive or negative though a certain "drift" may occur over
time, as in the case of natural selection. See JERVIS, supra note 9, at 125-128 (discussing positive
and negative feedback).
24. See Arthur, supra note 9, at 1-2 (discussing asymmetrical results in the marketplace
caused by positive feedbacks).
25. For example, in predator-prey relationships, as the number of prey increase, so do the
number of predators-a cross-species positive feedback loop. Once predators grow too
numerous, the prey population declines, which in a negative feedback loop, leads to a decline in
predators. See JERVIS, supra note 9, at 125-28 (discussing the impact of positive and negative
feedback).
26. See JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 134 (explaining feedback loop correlation in the context of
interconnected neural networks of the brain).
27. See CASTI, supra note 7, at 25-37 (discussing the three main types of attractors); GLEICK,
supra note 4, at 121-53 (discussing strange attractors). For example, in a watershed system,
streams, rivers, and run off, are attracted to the lowest geographical point of the basin, such as a
lake. The lake itself exerts no particular force on the river-the force of gravity is the motive
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kind of attractor, but the most significant in nonlinear systems are so-
called "strange attractors" associated with chaotic behavior. 2' A
system's behavioral trajectory over time may oscillate among attractors
of different strengths. 29  The existence of positive feedback loops and
strange attractors in complex systems may produce "chaotic" behavior.
Chaotic, in scientific terms, does not mean truly random as it is often
understood in common usage. Instead, chaotic systems are
deterministic and obey set rules of interaction which, when followed in
the aggregate, result in unpredictable behavior or "deterministic
randomness."3 ° Systems exhibiting chaotic behavior are "sensitive to
initial conditions"-even the slightest change in the initial conditions to
which identical systems respond can produce wide divergences in
system development.3' Certain patterns may recur but never in exactly
the same way because initial conditions will have changed. With
respect to actors within the system, their actions change the surrounding
environment so that the same action taken at a later point in time may
not produce the same result.32  Consequently, system behavior is
force-the lake is merely a destination, an attractor, to which the river is brought by the
interactions of gravity, rain, and geography. The various trajectories by which water runs into the
lake compose its basin of attraction. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 9, at 78 (explaining the attractor
concept).
28. Some attractors are fixed points, like the state of rest of a pendulum; others are cyclical,
like an infinite loop on a computer. Strange attractors produce a system trajectory more like a
tangled web in which the system trajectory loops around the attractor but never exactly repeats or
overlaps its previous path. See J. B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law In Modern
Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and
Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 419-26
[hereinafter Ruhl & Ruhl] (explaining the various kinds of attractors).
29. See LEWIN, supra note 4, at 20-21 (comparing the movement among attractors to that of
being drawn into and out of a series of whirlpools).
30. Id.
31. John Casti describes an illustrative example. A chemist watching a saltwater taffy-pulling
machine, which repeatedly performed the same mechanical function, observed that the raisins in
the taffy appeared to randomly change relative positions. He surmised that two raisins initially
placed very close together might, over time, end up in dramatically different positions, and that it
would be impossible to predict their future, relative positions. While the results appear to be
random (in that they are unpredictable), the rule of action, taffy-pulling, is deterministic. CASTI,
supra note 7, at 91-92. The phenomenon of sensitivity to initial conditions is widely known as
"the Butterfly Effect." A butterfly flapping its wings in the Amazon rain forest may, on one
occasion, set off a chain of events in the atmosphere that, a month later, produces a snowstorm in
New York; on another occasion, the butterfly's actions may have no effect at all. See LEWIN,
supra note 4, at 11 (explaining the Butterfly Effect as a feature of nonlinear systems).
32. See GLEICK, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that small changes in input could quickly become
significant changes in output); JERVIS, supra note 9, at 55 (stating that because actions change
their environment, identical later behavior does not produce identical results).
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historically contingent and changes in the system may be difficult or
impossible to reverse."
C. Evolution and Coevolution
Complex adaptive systems change in response to both their own
internal dynamics and outside stimuli. For example, markets respond to
changing tastes, costs of raw materials and numerous other factors.34
Apart from relatively infrequent exogenous catastrophes,35 adaptation
most often results from coevolution, in which the system responds to
changes in other systems with which it interacts, and those systems
similarly respond to changes in the primary system.36 The line between
a complex adaptive system's "environment" and coevolving systems
may often be indistinct since the environment to which a given system
responds consists primarily of other systems.37 Co-evolving systems
may mutually "tune" themselves to a state of maximum fitness.38
The typical pattern of system evolution is that of punctuated
equilibrium in which long, stable periods are followed by swift, often
33. Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 948, n.56.
34. See WALDROP, supra note 4, at II (explaining spontaneous self-organization and factors
that spark such adaptation).
35. For example, the complex environmental system that supported diverse species of
dinosaurs, according to recent hypotheses, was drastically altered by the entirely exogenous
stimulus of an asteroid impact, requiring that the many complex animal and plant systems
adapted to the former environment change or die. See LEWIN, supra note 4, at 76 (discussing the
asteroid hypothesis as an explanation for mass extinction).
36. See WALDROP, supra note 4, at 309 (discussing the connection between adaptation and
coevolution).
37. In biological evolution, for example, the environment in which a species evolves consists
of natural systems including the climate, tectonic activity, and predator-prey relationships. The
process of co-evolution is often described by analogy to a "fitness landscape" containing peaks of
high fitness and valleys of lower fitness. Because of the diversity of components in each system,
there will be conflicting constraints between the possible combinations of adaptive traits within
the system-it may be impossible to enhance one trait without degrading another. The peaks and
valleys of the fitness landscape represent more and less adaptive combinations of traits. See
LEWIN, supra note 4, at 57 (discussing the fitness landscape analogy). The objective of an
adaptive system will be to ascend the peaks, whether by walking across the landscape gradually,
testing out adaptive variations, or jumping long distances. Coevolution of systems means that the
landscape within which adaptation occurs is itself constantly changing. A typical example occurs
in predator-prey relationships where an adaptation giving the prey an advantage will spur a
responsive, "coupled" adaptation in the predator. If the prey becomes faster, ascending a new
peak in its landscape, it also changes the fitness landscape of its predator, forcing the predator to
become faster, find other prey, or face extinction. Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 28, at 430-31.
38. LEWIN, supra note 4, at 62. Fitness may have variable meanings depending on the nature
of the system observed. For biological systems, for example, it means the ability to survive and
reproduce. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 9, at 27 (discussing fitness peaks of different kinds of
systems). In the context of this paper, "fitness" refers to long-term sustainability of the system.
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drastic change.39  A punctuation typically sets off a period of
experimentation with many new forms, followed by a winnowing out of
less successful forms and increasing specialization.4 0  As a system
changes, it "learns," not in the sense of conscious accretion of
knowledge, but in the sense that its past continues to affect its ongoing
evolution. Complex systems have a history in which some paths areS 41
chosen and others foregone in a branching pattern of bifurcations.
Surviving species, technologies, business models, and the like are
simply those variations out of many experiments that prove most
resilient in adapting to changing circumstances.
D. Emergence
The characteristic of complex adaptive systems that contributes most
critically to such resilience is their ability to produce self-organized,
emergent behavior. Complex adaptive systems produce "order for
free., 42  System-wide patterns or properties "emerge" from the
aggregate behavior of system components that are following local rules
that have no particular relationship to the emergent properties of the
system. The existence of the local rules is essential for emergence to
occur because without them every agent would simply follow its own
39. See LEWIN, supra note 4, at 100-01 (explaining the idea of punctuated equilibrium).
Punctuated equilibrium is typified by the pre-Cambrian explosion of multi-cellular life forms
following long ages dominated by unicellular forms. Id. at 70-72. Because such patterns are
evident only over evolutionary time scales, an individual living during a relatively quiescent
period may believe the system to be stable and unchanging.
40. See id. at 70-71. In biological systems, such periods of drastic change contribute to
adaptation by increasing diversity. See Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 950-51. A similar
pattern is evident in environmental systems, economies, and technological systems. See, e.g.,
BAK, supra note 9, at 60-85 (observing that punctuated equilibrium is manifested in complex
physical systems such as the weather and tectonic movement). Bak asserts that the same pattern
is also evident in economies, though largely ignored by general equilibrium economics which
assumes perfectly rational behaviors not present in real world economies and discards large
fluctuations, such as stock market crashes, as aberrations. BAK, supra note 9, at 184-92. With
respect to technological systems, early developers of the automobile, for example, experimented
with many varieties of engines and body designs. Many of those designs failed to survive, a few
persisted, and the industry subsequently focused on more specialized innovations in those
systems. LEWIN, supra note 4, at 70-71. As the supply of oil dwindles and the adverse
economic, political, and environmental consequences of reliance on it mount, automakers have
once again begun to experiment with new forms, such as hybrid vehicles, in response to their
changing environment. Similarly, the development of computer software appears to follow a
cycle of experimentation with different formats, followed by winnowing down to a few
interoperable standards, followed by incremental improvements to those standards.
41. See GLEICK, supra note 4, at 76-80 (describing mathematical and biological bifurcations).
42. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 9, at 71-92 (describing processes of self-organization and
movement toward the edge of chaos).
Systems Perspective on File Sharing
rules, precluding the development of cooperative, shared behaviors4 3
However, knowledge of the local rules does not enable prediction of the
behavior of the system as a whole. Nor can one simply add the
component parts of the system together to predict behaviors because the
parts interact to produce system behavior quite different from the
behavior of the parts individually. The system is not just more than the
sum of its parts; it is different from the sum of its parts. 44
For example, the complex division of labor that emerges in an ant
colony is a collective behavior quite different from the simple
behavioral rules followed by individual ants.45 Likewise, in free market
economies, the aggregate activity of businesses and consumers pursuing
their own self-interests produce the emergent property described by
Adam Smith as the "invisible hand."46  Emergent properties are not
necessarily "good" or "bad" from a normative standpoint. They are
simply responses to conditions in the system and its surrounding
environment.47
Emergent patterns feed back to produce change in local rules and
behavior, which may then produce new emergent patterns in a cycle of
adaptation.48 Consequently, a reductive approach that studies only
system components and the local interactions among them is necessary,
but not sufficient, to gain an understanding of the system.49 An observer
must consider the system as a whole. Even then, complex systems defy
complete understanding or easy prediction of long-term behavior. °
43. See JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 181. The local rules themselves originate from many
sources depending on the nature of the system. For example, evolutionary adaptation, human
system design, social norms, and legal regulation may all be sources of local rules.
44. JERVIS, supra note 9, at 12-13. In a linear system, on the other hand, the whole does
equal the sum of its parts. JOHN HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: How ADAPTATION BUILDS
COMPLEXITY 15 (1995).
45. See JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 73-79. Individual ants simply deposit and react to
pheromone trails. But their collective activities, their "swarm logic," allow the colony as a whole
to prioritize between food sources and switch among activities such as nest-building, foraging,
and pupae-raising in response to changes in external conditions. Id.
46. LEWIN, supra note 4, at 13.
47. Tornados and hurricanes are emergent properties of weather systems and are hardly
considered a "good" thing by the self-aware, human complex adaptive systems living in their
paths. See JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 137 (discussing why emergent systems are not intrinsically
good).
48. See LEWIN, supra note 4, at 12-13 (discussing the idea of stability emerging out of
complex systems).
49. See CASTI, supra note 7, at 273 (discussing the limits of reductionism as a universal
problem solving approach).
50. Per Bak notes that each science has focused narrowly on its own specific field without
reference to others because of the impossibility of predicting, or reproducing, emergent
phenomena through the usual scientific method of prediction followed by reproducible
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E. Unpredictability and the Law of Unintended Consequences
Not surprisingly, systems characterized by multiple interconnected
components, nonlinearity and emergence tend to be full of surprises.
While local interactions among system components often follow
predictable patterns, behavior of the system as a whole over any
significant length of time is likely to be unpredictable."1
Human participation in complex systems adds another layer of
complication.52 Humans consciously seek to control many systems
because they are directly affected by system behavior.53 Societies use
law to shape the courses of many social, political, and economic
systems. Individuals adjust their behaviors according to the impact they
believe that their own actions and the actions of others will have on the
system.54 Given the nature of complex systems, such adjustments and
interventions tend to produce multiple effects, some of them indirect or
experimentation. However, the traditional scientific method leaves untouched vast areas of
scientific interest including biological evolution, economics, and history. BAK, supra note 9, at
7-8.
51. See JERVIS, supra note 9, at 16 (discussing the unpredictability of the outcomes from
interaction among individual actors). For example, meteorologists know a great deal about the
dynamics of hurricanes, which are outputs of massive, complex weather systems, but forecasters
can do no better than to outline an enormous "cone of uncertainty" covering hundreds of miles
through some part of which any particular storm might track. Earthquakes and volcanic
eruptions, the outcomes of the complex system of plate tectonics, are similarly unpredictable.
Following 2004's disastrous earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean, one commentator
suggested that many seemingly unrelated seismic events may be manifestations of a global
dynamic system in which the shift in one tectonic plate triggers events halfway around the world.
Simon Winchester, The Year the Earth Fought Back, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2004, at A21. See
also Nick Madigan & Kenneth Chang, Quake Hits California 11 Years Late, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 2004, at A12 (reporting on the final occurrence, years after scientists predicted it would occur,
of a strong quake in a small town on the San Andreas fault). In October, 2004, scientists
frequently altered their forecasts as to whether Mount Saint Helens would erupt or merely let off
steam. See Sarah Kershaw, Bigger Eruption Predicted at Mount St. Helens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2004, at 129 (reporting on scientific predictions regarding the likelihood of additional volcanic
eruptions and seismic activity).
52. See Arthur, supra note 9, at 107 (discussing the human elements of economics as the
cause for a layer of complication that does not exist in the natural sciences).
53. For example, we suffer the ill effects of violent weather, so we have sought for years, with
limited success, to devise weather control strategies.
54. For example, economic actors "adjust their market moves, buying decisions, prices, and
forecasts to the situation these moves or decisions or prices or forecasts together create." Arthur,
supra note 9, at 107. In international politics, national actors anticipate the strategies of other
nations and formulate their own strategies accordingly; strategies adopted by one nation may
forestall the adoption of certain strategies by others. See JERVIS, supra note 9, at 44-45
(discussing the added complexity introduced when actors alter their strategy in reaction to others,
in anticipation of what others will do).
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delayed, that ripple throughout the system.55 Many effects may be
unintended by the actors who trigger them. 56
Like emergent properties, unintended consequences may be
normatively good, bad or neutral. In capitalist systems, economic
growth may be the unintended result of the pursuit of self-interest in the
marketplace.57 Centralized planning in communist systems, on the other
hand, imposed arbitrary standards that, followed to the letter, eliminated
the flexibility needed to respond to changing circumstances and
produced the unintended result of economic stagnation.58 Obviously,
unintended consequences cannot be avoided simply by imposing strict
controls. Complexity theory indicates the traits that render system
behavior inherently unpredictable are also essential to system
sustainability over time. The most robust systems find, and indeed may
inherently seek, a balance between ordered and chaotic behaviors.
F. The Edge of Chaos
Complex behavior occurs primarily at the border between completely
ordered and completely chaotic behaviors, a state referred to as "the
edge of chaos" or self-organized criticality. 9 The most robust systems
55. See JERVIS, supra note 9, at 10-11, 29-32 (discussing the idea that the effect of a
disturbance to a system produces multiple linked effects throughout the system).
56. For example, efforts to simplify patent prosecution may have the effect of stifling
innovation. See Sabra Chartrand, Patents; In a Forthcoming Book, Two Professors Make
Suggestions on Reinventing the Patent System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at C8 (reporting on a
study by Professors Josh Lerner and Adam Jaffe showing that simplification of the patent system,
intended to encourage innovation, produced a degradation in the patent review process and
increasingly aggressive patent enforcement, resulting in anti-innovative exploitation of patents for
lawsuits). Efforts to encourage safety by imposing seat belt laws may have the effect of
increasing pedestrian fatalities as buckled drivers, confident of their own safety, drive more
carelessly. JERVIS, supra note 9, at 68-69. The Reagan Administration's cutoff of funds to
abortion centers in developing countries, intended to reduce the number of abortions,
paradoxically increased them because the centers were also the only source of birth control-
more unwanted pregnancies produced more abortions. Id. at 61-62. The Federal Superfund law,
designed to reclaim contaminated lands, led unexpectedly to the "brownfields" problem, in which
developers avoided abandoned urban industrial sites for fear of liability under Superfund. Ruhl &
Ruhl, supra note 28, at 424. Edward Termer offers numerous examples of the unintended
consequences of technological development, which he denominates the "revenge effect."
EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK 5-25 (1996).
57. See JERVIS, supra note 9, at 65-66 (suggesting that economic growth may be the
unintended consequence of the tension between Protestantism and the individual desire for self-
enrichment that generates the "invisible hand").
58. Id. at 63.
59. Theorists developed the edge of chaos construct in the context of the study of artificial
intelligence through the use of computer models such as cellular automata. Such models
suggested that the complex behaviors essential to life and intelligence occur at a state that
resembles a phase transition between a solid and fluid. At this "edge," the system neither locks
into rigid order nor dissolves into chaos, but is both stable enough to store information and
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find an internal balance between linear, predictable behaviors and
nonlinear, unpredictable behaviors, which has been described as "a 'no-
man's land' in which chaos and stability pull in opposite directions."6 °
This state provides the system with both the stability and the flexibility
needed to adapt to changing circumstances. 6' Systems that maintain the
right mix of ordered and chaotic behaviors-balancing constraint and
chance-survive over the long term.6' History affirms that neither
rigidly controlled systems, like centralized communist systems, nor
anarchic systems, like complete laissez-faire economies, are optimal.
Healthy systems find a balance.63
Systems which are "self-critical" or poised at the edge of chaos, if
disturbed repeatedly, produce a probabilistic range of responses
described as a "power law distribution." Big responses are rare, small
ones are common, intermediate responses occur at a rate somewhere in-
evanescent enough to transmit it. Such systems can be organized to perform complex
computations and adapt spontaneously to the world. The concept of self-organizing criticality
developed in the context of the study of physical systems but is similarly a concept describing a
sort of phase transition from one state to another. Related research suggests that the two
constructs describe equivalent states. Experimentation with simulations of genetic networks
suggested that, through the evolutionary forces of mutation and natural selection, systems may
naturally evolve and coevolve toward this state. WALDROP, supra note 4, at 292-310. Per Bak,
the chief formulator of the concept of self-organizing criticality, observed that truly chaotic and
truly stable systems do not evolve; only those systems at the border evolve. See BAK, supra note
9, at 29-30 (defining self-organizing criticality).
60. See LEWIN, supra note 4, at 51. Systems positioning themselves in this state may exhibit
"homeostatic" mechanisms, that is, processes like negative feedbacks that help the system to
maintain stability as it evolves. Id. at 117-18 (discussing the Gala hypothesis, which states that
all life on earth functions as a single organism maintaining conditions on the planet in a
homeostatic state suitable to its needs).
61. Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 947.
In a sense, these systems are drawing as much as possible from the adaptive qualities
of nonlinearity without falling all the way into disaster. They are being held back from
the edge by the presence of ordered, linear behavioral qualities in the system. A
system poised in this manner 'at the edge of chaos' is likely to be adaptive and
successful-in other words, a complex adaptive system.
Id.
62. The best-known illustration of self-organized criticality involves a physical system: the
steady sprinkle of sand grains raining down on a pile of sand on a tabletop. The pile eventually
reaches a point where it cannot grow any more-as new sand is added, old sand cascades down
the sides and off the edge of the table at the same rate. The sand pile is self-organized in that it
has reached a steady state without any extraneous control, and it is in a critical state because the
sand grains on the surface are just barely stable. In other words, the sand pile has spontaneously
reached a state where order and disorder coexist in balance. BAK, supra note 9, at 49-64. Bak
considered self-organized criticality to be essential to complex systems and applied the principle
to landscape formation, earthquakes, clouds, solar flares, biological evolution, and economics.
63. See WALDROP, supra note 4, at 293-294 (discussing the need for economies to find a
balance between order and chaos).
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between. 6' Power law distributions have been found in a variety of
physical and human systems.65
In summary, complex adaptive systems typically display complexity
in both structure and behavior. They adapt to changing circumstances
over time through nonlinear mechanisms that, though grounded in
predictable local rules of interaction, produce in the aggregate entirely
unexpected behaviors. The most successful systems achieve a balance
between ordered and chaotic behavior that permits them to weather
alterations in the surrounding environment. The music production and
distribution system can be analyzed as a complex system exhibiting
these universal characteristics.
III. THE MUSIC SYSTEM AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM
Because complex systems overlap, coevolve, and nest within each
other, it can be difficult to define the boundaries of a particular system.
System definition is usually based on the observer's goals rather than
dictated by any intrinsic property in the system itself.66  This article
analyzes the complex system through which music sound recordings are
produced and distributed. The means by which music recordings are
created and disseminated constitute a human-created system by any
definition. Within this system, technological, economic, social, legal,
and political systems, and all their nested subsystems, overlap and
interact with specific reference to sound recordings. Formal law,
particularly copyright law, plays a critical role in the workings of this
67
system. Viewed holistically, the music system exhibits the
characteristics typical of all complex adaptive systems.
64. In the case of the self-critical sand pile, when the next falling grain of sand strikes the pile,
it is impossible to predict what might happen. The steady sprinkle of sand triggers cascades of all
sizes: big avalanches are rare, small ones are frequent. The average frequency of a given size of
avalanche is inversely proportional to some power of its size. For any individual grain of sand, it
is impossible to predict which outcome may occur. See LEWIN, supra note 4, at 61 (describing
the sand pile metaphor as a system poised at a critical state); WALDROP, supra note 4, at 305
(applying the sand pile analogy).
65. Studies of earthquake distributions show, for example, that fault zones do not build
pressure until they slip catastrophically, but rather approach the point of slippage, then undergo a
steady succession of slips of various magnitudes that serve to keep the tension at the critical point
until, eventually, a major earthquake occurs. WALDROP, supra note 4, at 305-306. See also
Arthur, supra note 9, at 109 (describing the phase transition of financial markets into complex
regimes); BAK, supra note 9, at 9, 183-98 (describing the operation of power laws generally and
their application to price fluctuations and traffic jams).
66. Casti observes that complexity is not an intrinsic property of a system taken in isolation,
but rather is a joint property of the system and its interaction with another system, typically an
observer or controller. CASTI, supra note 7, at 267.
67. The system is a concrete, law-related system because it involves real people, institutions,
and products. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 488 (discussing systems analysis as applied to legal
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A. Multiple, Interconnected Components
Certainly, the traditional recording industry includes many individual
and institutional components, including artists and their managers,
agents, recording companies which are typically part of larger
entertainment conglomerates, industry associations like the Recording
Industry of America (RIAA), performance rights societies, intermediate
distributors, advertisers, concert promoters, retailers, and consumers.
The music system, however, comprises more than the traditional
recording industry. Many cities and regions support local music scenes
and independent recording labels.68  Production, marketing and
distribution often occur outside the formal industry structure as
independent artists create and distribute their own works. Consumers
contribute to distribution by sharing works and creating new "mixes. 69
In this broadly defined system, one can identify many overlapping,
interacting subsystems including music-related technologies and their
providers, formal music markets, socio-cultural groups and practices,
political organizations, legal institutions and regimes.70  All of these
scholarship). The article recognizes that the musical compositions which are essential inputs to
this system also follow additional distribution paths and that the returns to composers from the
sale of sound recordings incentivize the production of music compositions as well as recordings.
In copyright law, the musical composition and the sound recording of that composition are
separate copyrightable subject matters which receive different levels of copyright protection. See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining the terms musical works and sound recordings); Lydia Loren,
Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 673, 679-98 (2003)
(summarizing the history of and the differing copyright treatments of musical compositions and
sound recordings). The creation of "musical works" is, therefore, separate but prerequisite to the
creation of music sound recordings and may or may not involve the same artists.
68. See DIANE RAPAPORT, A MUSIC BUSINESS PRIMER 1-6 (2003) (discussing the "ecology"
of the music industry); Mihir Parikh, The Music Industry in the Digital World: Waves of Changes
(Aug. 1999), http://www.ite.poly.edu/htmls/musicwave02.htm (discussing the current structure
of the music industry).
69. "Mixes" are sound recordings produced by combining and/or adjusting sounds from more
than one source. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11 th ed. 2003) (defining
mix as "to produce (a sound recording) by electronically combining or adjusting sounds from
more than one source"). Typically, fans record their own collections of favorite songs from one
or more artists. They may also electronically alter the originals. Artists may issue new "mixes"
of their own songs. Entire web sites are devoted to the creation and sharing of mixes. See, e.g.,
Art of the Mix, http://www.artoftherix.org/index.asp (allowing users to browse mixes of their
own). For a personal account of the changing technologies for making mix tapes and CDs, see
Thurston Moore, The Best 90 Minutes of My Life, WIRED 13.04, Apr. 2005, at 3, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/ 3.04/play.html?pg=3.
70. LoPucki suggests three principles of system definition for law-related systems: the human
participation test, the interaction principle, and the purpose principle. LoPucki, supra note 2, at
498-501. Obviously, human beings do participate in the music system. Under the other two
tests, the system components must interact more with each other than with components in the
surrounding environment, and all persons or things essential to system function must be included.
Certainly, all of the subsystems noted above interact extensively with each other, though some
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subsystems directly affect the production and distribution of music
recordings and each contains diverse components which are also
complex adaptive systems. 1  In typical fashion, the subsystems
interacting in the music system also participate in other systems.72 Each
subsystem responds to changes in the others and those changes ramify
through the interconnections in the music system as a whole.
The elements of the music system are richly interconnected and both
information and money flow through those interconnections. Even
prior to popularization of the Internet, the music system contained
intricate connections among producers, distributors, and consumers.
Content, including advertising as well as music, flowed from artists
through studios then downward through controlled channels to
consumers; money and consumer feedback flowed back to providers.
Channels of distribution included radio, television, and retail and
wholesale chains, all of whom distributed musical content in many
formats produced by a variety of technology providers. 73  The Internet
multiplied those connections geometrically and globally, in particular
by providing low-cost direct connections between artists and consumers
and lateral connections among consumers. Thus, the music system
exhibits the complex structure typical of complex adaptive systems. Its
behavior is similarly complex.
B. Nonlinearity
Like most nonlinear systems, the music system follows established
rules, but the aggregation of system activities creates feedback loops
and produces nonlinear behavior. At the local level, the interacting
subsystems affecting production and distribution of music recordings all
impose rules governing the behavior of system participants.
Technology rules include, among other things, technical standards and
also interact with entities outside the music system. All are necessary for the system to function.
While the political system might simply be considered the instrumentality for producing laws, it
is particularly active and subject to competing influences at present.
71. The technology subsystem includes provider industries, networks, retailers, and consumers
of music-related technology. Diverse organizations and individuals participate in the music
market, including all of the entities that form the recognized "industry." Many system
participants, particularly artists and consumers, form social communities whose practices involve
music recording and distribution. The adoption of file sharing as a social norm by consumers is
at the center of the current debate. The parties to that debate seek to influence Congress, itself
part of a complex political system, to produce laws that favor their interests; the resulting legal
regimes, like the copyright regime, are complex systems.
72. Technology providers, for example, develop technologies used to distribute materials
other than music, recording studios sell products in addition to sound recordings and consumers
buy many other entertainment products.
73. See Parikh, supra note 68, at 2 (describing the methods of music distribution).
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formats and rights management rules. The market imposes rules of
commercial practice. Socio-cultural behavior follows accepted norms
and political actors follow rules of governance set out in the
Constitution. Copyright law imposes the primary legal rules, although
other disciplines, such as contract and property, also play a role.74
As actors within the system go about their daily business, all of these
rule sets affect their behavior. Although concern over file sharing
focuses on its economic impacts, there are significant non-economic
forces at play within the system. Actors may be motivated by forces
including the creative impulse, sociality and the drive to innovate, as
well as by economic self-interest. Unlike the simple rule sets used in
computer models and often found in natural complex systems, the rule
sets in the music system can be quite complex and may conflict. File
sharing, for example, may represent a disconnection between the social
norm rule sets and the copyright law rule set.
7
Feedback loops are clearly in operation within the music system.
Music producers receive consumer feedback in terms of cash and
information, which in turn affects their future business strategies. New
technological formats like MP3 76 and its successors feed into the system
producing demand for portable players like the iPod whose success
feeds back into the system and produces increased demand for content
available in portable formats.77 The digital rights management (DRM)
arms race is a classic positive feedback loop as is the explosive growth
of P2P systems.78
Whether the music system demonstrates the influence of attractors is
a more problematic extension of the complex system analogy. Some
writers have mapped the mathematics-intensive science of attractors
onto human systems, suggesting, for example, that social structures like
bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and nation states are attractors in the process
of cultural evolution,79 or that freedoms, rights, and regulations are
74. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 121-24 (2004) (describing law, norms, system
architecture, and markets as "modalities of regulation").
75. Studies have repeatedly shown that consumers do not consider music file sharing to be
morally wrong. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, In Fight Over Online Music, Industry Now Offers a
Carrot, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, at A11 (describing how the social norm finds file sharing quite
acceptable, while copyright law forbids many sharing activities as infringements).
76. MP3 is the short form for the most popular audio compression standard-Moving Picture
Experts Group's MPEG-I audio layer 3.
77. See infra Part UI.D (summarizing Apple's iPod and iTunes products).
78. In the DRM arms race, each attempt by copyright owners to impose electronic restrictions
on their product inspires hackers to break the DRM system, which in turn requires copyright
owners to develop stronger DRM, which is in turn hacked and so on.
79. LEWIN, supra note 4, at 21.
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attractors in the environmental law system.8 ° The music system, as
defined in reference to commercial sound recordings, is so young in
evolutionary terms that attractors based on historical patterns of the
system are difficult to define.81 If it is presumed that the traditional
centralized industry structure represents one attractor, it may be that a
new attractor favoring decentralized dissemination is only beginning to
manifest itself in the long-term evolution of the system.
The analogy to complex systems may be less than convincing with
respect to the existence of attractors. However, overall behavior of the
music system is clearly nonlinear in the sense that small causes may
have disproportionate effects and single causes may have multiple
effects of varying magnitudes. Of most relevance to this article is the
tinkering of the young programmer who developed the first P2P
software and created the Napster phenomenon,82 which set off a wave of
responses, many of them legal. For example, the RIAA successfully
sued and shut down Napster,83 thereby channeling technological
development toward decentralized file sharing systems, which proved
harder to control through copyright infringement actions. 4 The initial
failure of law suits to stop file sharing inspired a raft of legislative
proposals to control the practice 85 as well as the RIAA's direct law suits
80. See Ruhl, Complexity, supra note 9, at 862-875 (using complexity theory on attractors in
relation to the socio-legal system with particular reference to environmental law and arguing that
the attractors in the environmental law system are freedoms, rights, and regulation); J. B. Ruhl,
The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory To Describe The Evolution of Law and Society and
Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1407, 1440-1448 (1996) [hereinafter
Ruhl, Fitness] (applying the science of attractors to law generally).
81. The first sound recordings were made in the late 1800s, and commercial phonographs
were introduced in the early 1900s. Loren, supra note 67, at 686. In evolutionary terms, a mere
century is a very short span compared, for example, to the hundreds or thousands of years
involved in the development of social institutions.
82. The lone programmer was, famously, Shawn Fanning, who developed the program to help
create a music community. Giancarlo Varanini, Q&A: Napster Creator Shawn Fanning, ZDNET,
Mar. 2, 2000, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-502047.html?legacy=zdnn.
83. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding sufficient
evidence that Napster engaged in both contributory and vicarious copyright infringement); see
also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming the grant of a
preliminary injunction to shut down a centralized file sharing system that employed instant
messaging).
84. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D.
Cal. 2003), aff d 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
The lower courts found no secondary liability for purveyors of decentralized file sharing
software. The Supreme Court later reversed and remanded for review under its newly-announced
"inducement" standard. 125 S. Ct. at 2780-83.
85. See, e.g., Inducing Infringements of Copyright Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004),
(expanding significantly the scope of secondary liability for copyright infringement with a
specific view toward punishing providers of peer-to-peer technologies); see infra, Part V
(discussing this and numerous other proposals).
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86against users. Suits against users may have discouraged some users
from file sharing at all, sent some underground and sent others to legal
online services ultimately contributing to the success of Apple iTunes
and its imitators. While these activities follow established legal rules,
their outcomes have been unpredictable as change cascades through the
system. As is typical of systems exhibiting chaotic behaviors and
sensitive to initial conditions, the changes in the music system appear
likely to be irreversible.88
C. Evolution and Coevolution
P2P is forcing change in all of the subsystems coevolving within the
music system. The music system has obviously adapted over time to
encompass many new technologies, analog and digital, as well as
related changes in cultural behaviors and legal rules. The system and its
components are open systems, coevolving in response to internal
dynamics and environmental stimuli. The course of that evolution
follows the typical pattern of punctuated equilibrium. The system
gradually absorbed previous innovations in copying technologies with
minor disruption, but the combination of digital copying technologies
with Internet connectivity forced the system to a punctuation point
requiring rapid, drastic adaptation. The system's past history affected
its response. The major labels were entrenched in old, brick-and-mortar
business models and proved reluctant to assay the new online
environment. Industry inflexibility, in part, provided the window of
opportunity for the development and popularization of P2P.
By analogy to the evolution of other complex systems, one should
now expect a period of experimentation in the music system, followed
86. See Fred von Lohman, Is Suing Your Customers a Good Idea?, LAW.COM, Sept. 29, 2004,
http://www.law.corrjsp?id=1095434496352 (noting that thousands of such suits have now been
brought). An industry trade association, the International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry, launched the first suits against European file sharers in October 2004. Bernhard
Warner, Music Piracy Lawsuits Launched Across Europe, CNN.com, Oct. 7, 2004,
http://www.cnn.corm/2004/TECH/internet/10/07/europe.music.piracy.ap/index.html.
87. Surveys differ over the actual impact of the lawsuits on file sharing activities. Compare
Pew Internet and American Life Project, Data Memo, Jan. 2004,
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPFile-Swapping-Memo-0104.pdf (reporting sharp decline
in file sharing after initiation of RIAA law suits) and Data Memo, April 2004,
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPFilesharingApril_04.pdf (reporting continued overall
decline in illegal downloading as result of suits, but slight short term increase in relation to late
2003 survey) with Thomas Karagiannis, et al., Is P2P Dying or Just Hiding?, Nov.-Dec. 2004,
http://www.caida.org/outreach/papers/2004/p2p-dying/index.xml (describing a study by
researchers at the University of California, Riverside indicating that, if measured accurately, P2P
traffic has never declined).
88. The popular, metaphoric statement that "the P2P genie is out of the bottle and can never
be stuffed back in" is entirely "in tune" with the nonlinear dynamics of complex systems.
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by a winnowing out of new business models and technologies, reducing
them to a relatively small number of successful forms. Indeed, the
system has lately exhibited the behavior most typical of complex
adaptive systems-self-organization producing emergent behaviors.
D. Emergence
The aggregation of the local, self-interested activities of actors in the
music system has produced new emergent properties, including the
growth of P2P file sharing and the responsive development of new
business models. The localized interactions of P2P technology
providers and consumers, pursuing their own interests, produced the
emergent phenomena of vast P2P networks through which music may
be transmitted without approval of or payment to the copyright
owners." File sharers opted out of the existing legal and economic rule
sets, at least with respect to some of their transactions, and did so in
such numbers as to create, in effect, an anti-market based on sharing
norms set in opposition to copyright rules and market practices.9 °
Whether file sharing is a "good" or "bad" emergent property of the
system has not clearly been established. The emergence of file sharing
may, on the one hand, pose a threat to copyright holders and artists'
incentives, though the evidence to date is inconclusive.9 On the other
hand, its development forced the music industry, finally, to quit
dragging its feet and move ahead with legal online distribution systems
and new forms of offline distribution increasing the dissemination of
music. Additionally, P2P technology has a number of beneficial uses
that do not constitute copyright infringement.
92
Whether file sharing is good, bad, or a mixed blessing, it has fed back
down into the system, causing new adaptations. Some are fairly
predictable responses to P2P: cooperation on music licensing for the
89. While P2P systems could be said to arise primarily from the technology subsystem, their
original purpose was music file sharing and the participation of music consumers was essential to
their success so the phenomenon as a whole emerges from the music system.
90. Survey results vary as to the actual number of users engaged in music downloading, but
the anti-market is apparently quite large. See, e.g., Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The
Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, March 2004,
http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/fileSharing-March2OO4.pdf (citing data indicating that over
60 million Americans over the age of twelve have engaged in music file sharing.)
91. See discussion infra Part II.F (explaining that the music system should be analyzed with
empirical research).
92. The Ninth Circuit in the Grokster case, for example, found noninfringing uses including
sharing of public domain works and works whose copyright owners intentionally made them
available for free sharing. The court specifically referred to bands like Wilco who distribute their
music directly to consumers. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d
1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
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Internet,93 issuance of licenses to legitimate online distributors,94
application of digital rights management technology to prevent copying,
lawsuits against P2P providers and users and the adoption of file sharing
features by legitimate services.95 Others are more unusual, including:
agreements between universities and legal online providers to provide
students with "free" legal music,96 experimental marketing alliances to
use sponsored downloads to support sales of commercial music on the
P2P networks, 97 digital-only releases98 and direct artist-to-consumer
distribution over the Internet.99  Schemes for using P2P networks
profitably and legally are also underway.' °° Two related developments
are particularly noteworthy: the success of the Apple iTunes business
model for online music distribution and the related development of less
restrictive DRM regimes for both downloads and compact discs (CDs).
93. Songwriters, Music Publishers Announce Deal to Cooperate on Net Music Licensing, 6
ELEC. COM. & LAW REP. (BNA) 40, 1063 (Oct. 17, 2001).
94. See, e.g., John Borland, Music Label Widens Door to Net, http://news.com.com/2102-
1023-965712.html (last modified Nov. 13, 2002) (describing how a record label expanded what
consumers can legally do with music accessed via online services).
95. See Jon Healey, Music Industry Taking Cues from File Sharing, L.A. TIMES, July 26,
2004, at CI (explaining the music industry's attempt to make legitimate use of file sharing).
96. See Amy Argetsinger, GWU Students Will Get Free Tunes This Fall, WASH. POST
NEWSBYTES, July 17, 2004, at A01, available at 2004 WL 55866657 (describing the deal
between Napster and George Washington University that permits students to download certain
music files). Obviously, as Napster is now a for-profit operation, either the University or a donor
finances such arrangements. Similar deals have been struck by other music providers. See John
Borland, More Colleges Get Cheap Online Music, http://news.com.com/2110-1027-5318591.html
(Aug. 20, 2004) (listing the universities involved in low-cost downloading for students).
97. See Promo Uses P2P Networks to Sell Songs, http://news.com.com/2100-1027-
5251479.html (June 29, 2004) (explaining various deals to sell music online). Warner Brothers
recently allowed R.E.M.'s new album to be posted on MySpace.com two weeks prior to its
offline release. The web site offered information about the band and allowed fans to buy the
album from Amazon, but did not permit downloading. Warner Brothers hoped advance sampling
would promote album sales. Frank Ahrens, Record Labels Aim for Net, Hope to Score, WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 2004, at E01.
98. Jeff Leeds, Music Industry is Trying Out Digital-Only Releases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
2004, at C 1.
99. See, e.g., Fred Kaplan, D.LY Meets N.R.L. (No Record Label), N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2004,
at B23 (describing a company called ArtistShare that sells musicians self-produced CDs over the
World Wide Web and turns the proceeds, minus a small fee, over to the musicians). Many bands
unable to get contracts with record labels release their music directly to consumers. Wilco, for
example, offered one of its albums online for free after it was dropped by a record label and
found that the exposure boosted sales of the album when it was later released by a different label.
See Xeni Jardin, Music is Not a Loaf of Bread, WIRED NEWS,
http://www.wired.comlnews/culture/O,1284,65688,00.html (Nov. 15, 2004) (describing how the
band Wilco used file sharing to reach its fans).
100. See, e.g., Katie Dean, File Sharing Growing Like a Weed, WIRED NEWS,
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0, 1412,65774,00.html (Nov. 22, 2004) (describing Weed,
a software program that allows fans to download a song free and play it three times, then prompts
them to pay for subsequent hearings).
Systems Perspective on File Sharing
Apple's iTunes, launched in spring, 2003, was billed as a happy
medium between free but illegal P2P systems like Napster and
subscription services like Rhapsody.'0 ' Apple negotiated legal licenses
for hundreds of thousands of songs and now provides downloads in a
format of higher quality than standard MP3 files for a relatively low fee
per song with no subscription fee.102  Perhaps most significantly,
Apple's DRM system, Fair Play, permits iTunes downloads to be
transferred to iPod players, burned on CDs, and accessed on multiple
computers. 10 3 Unlike its predecessors in legal online music distribution,
Apple recognized and enabled a reasonable scope of personal,
noncommercial use and sharing. This feature, combined with the broad
appeal of the nifty iPod player and an eye- and ear-catching advertising
campaign, vaulted iTunes into a dominant position in the legal
download market.1 4  Apple proved that licensed, value-added pay
services could compete successfully with free file sharing networks
even in the absence of new, protective legislation or an overhaul of the
copyright system. Its rate of growth has continued to accelerate, fueled
by the popularity of the iPod.'05
Numerous online music providers, including a new, legal Napster,
have now adopted similar strategies. °6  The recording studios
101. See John Borland, Apple Unveils Music Store, http://news.com.com/2100-1027-
998590.html (Apr. 28, 2003) (describing the opening of the Apple store as a way to reach out to
new customers).
102. THE BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY, ITUNES: How COPYRIGHT,
CONTRACT, AND TECHNOLOGY SHAPE THE BUSINESS OF DIGITAL MEDIA - A CASE STUDY 8-11
(2004), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/uploads/370/iTunesWhitePaperO6O4.pdf [hereinafter
ITUNES WHITE PAPER].
103. For a comprehensive case study of the iTunes Music Store, see id. Apple's current terms
of use permit unlimited portability to the iPod, use on five computers, unlimited CD bums, but
only 7 burns of the same playlist. See Terms of Sale,
http://www.info.apple.com/usen/itunes/policies.htmI (last visited Aug. 28, 2005) (describing
iTunes sale policies). The 7-burn limitation was a recent reduction from a former allowance of
10, but the 5-computer restriction is an increase from a former allowance of 3. John Markoff,
Apple Sells 70 Million Songs in First Year of iTunes Service, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at C10.
104. As of July 2004, Apple controlled an estimated 70% of the legal download market and
45% of the market for portable music players. Laurie J. Flynn, iTunes Shores Up Its Defenses as
Rivals Prepare to Invade, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2004, at C4. By December 2004, Apple
controlled an estimated 90% of the high capacity player market and introduced the Shuffle iPod
to attack the market for small capacity players. See Michael Marriott, And Now for Something
Slightly Different, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2004, at GI (describing some of the marketing tactics of
Apple and its competitors).
105. See Ina Fried, iTunes Hits 200 Million Download Mark,
http://news.com.com/iTunes+hits+200+million+download+mark/2100-1027_3-5494390.htmil
(Dec. 16, 2004) (examining the growth of iTunes).
106. Mp3.com offers a helpful directory of online services and their features from which most
of the following data is drawn. See mp3.com, Digital Music Services, http://www.mp3.com/tech/
servicesindex.php (last visited Aug. 28, 2005) (listing available online music services).
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themselves are experimenting with legal, controlled distribution through
peer-to-peer networks. 10 7  Rough consensus seems to be developing
around pricing points 8 and the permissible scope of noncommercial
personal uses, with policies fluctuating in response to competitive
pressures. Unlimited portability to playback devices and CD bums are
permitted, as is use on multiple computers. 9 Some services provide
additional features such as use of email to share songs, posting of user
and celebrity playlists, and creation of mini-albums."0
In the offline market, BMG (now Sony BMG) introduced a new
rights-managed CD format to permit legal, limited song sharing. The
format allows portability to playback devices, limited CD bums,
copying to a computer, and email transmission of temporary copies to
friends."1 The DRM scheme was hacked almost immediately, but the
company claimed to be content to have created a "speed bump" that
would deter most users from unauthorized copying.! 2  While less
flexible than MP3 files and offering more limited uses than services like
iTunes, the BMG format is a step in the same direction."' In both cases,
the exact number of uses allowed may be less significant than the
recognition that personal, noncommercial uses are essential to market
viability.
107. See Katie Dean, P2P Tilts Toward Legitimacy, WIRED NEWS,
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,65836,00.html (Nov. 24, 2004) (indicating that
three major music labels have signed deals to provide content for a new, legal P2P service).
108. Almost universally, the price per song is somewhere below the inexplicably "magic" $1
limit. Pricing will undoubtedly undergo further changes in response to competitive pressures.
For example, RealNetworks slashed its per song and per album fees for a limited time in
conjunction with its introduction of reverse-engineered iPod-compatible software. See John
Borland, RealNetworks Slashes Song Prices, http://news.com.com/2102-1027_3-5312143.html
(last modified Aug. 17, 2004) (explaining RealNetworks' pricing campaign).
109. The rules governing allowable CD "bums" may vary per service or per track, but the
majority of services provide unlimited bums. There may, however, be limits on bums of the
same playlist. The number of computers on which a track can be used varies considerably but
almost all services accept multiple access to some degree. See mp3.com, supra note 106
(detailing the options available on various music services).
110. See Licensed Online Music Services See Upside to Limited File-Sharing, DETROIT
NEws, Jul. 28, 2004, http://www.detnews.com/2004/technologyl0407/28/technology-224808.htm
(describing new features offered by some online services).
111. Frank Ahrens, BMG Offers Legal Song Sharing, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2003, at E01.
112. See John Borland, Shift Key Breaks CD Copy Locks, http://news.com.com/2100-1025-
5087875.html (Oct. 7, 2003) (describing anti-theft efforts).
113. Microsoft also offers a Media Data Session Toolkit which supports delivery of dual
session or second session CDs on which one session is completely secured, but a second session
is governed by rules that allow consumers to engage in some activities, such as transfer to a
portable device, but not others. THE BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY, COPYRIGHT
AND DIGITAL MEDIA IN A POST-NAPSTER WORLD, UPDATE, 47,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/files/wp2005.pdf (last modified Jan. 2005).
Systems Perspective on File Sharing
All of the developments described above indicate that the system is
adapting to the emergent property of P2P file sharing by producing new
emergent patterns. The most successful of these adaptations take a
middle road between the pay-per-use model promoted by the recording
industry and the music-for-free model facilitated by P2P technology.
That middle road might not have appeared without the unexpected
emergence of P2P and the feedback dynamics of the music system,
which generated emergent responses from system actors willing to learn
from the P2P experience and experiment with new business forms.
These emergent behaviors could not have been anticipated based on
knowledge of the rules of interaction governing the system prior to P2P.
E. Unpredictability and the Law of Unintended Consequences
The system's recent behavior has been unpredictable. The
development of centralized P2P technology by a then unknown
programmer and the rapid growth of the Napster service appear to have
been complete, and rather unpleasant, surprises for the music industry.
While the music industry attempted to derail the P2P juggernaut, other
actors, like Apple, saw opportunity rather than threat and responded
accordingly. These responses also produced a number of surprises.
Devotees of the "celestial jukebox,"'1 4 for example, may find it
surprising that the most successful business model for online music
distribution is not the pay-per-use model, in which users possess no
permanent copies of recordings but merely tap into a subscription
service when they wish to hear music, paying micro-charges for every
play. Many users obviously not only like to have their own copies, but
they like to manipulate them in order to produce their own mixes and
play-lists in a form of grass roots creativity seemingly unanticipated by
promoters of strict pay-per-use models. 5 It may be an even bigger
surprise that the most successful model is not run by the recording
studios, but by a hardware manufacturer and is not content driven, but
device driven.
114. The phrase "celestial jukebox" is used rather loosely to describe music delivery systems
in which all delivery is made through the Internet and physical copies of music disappear. Some
users of the phrase presuppose that music will be streamed on demand, rather than downloaded to
the user's hard drive, with a micro-charge imposed for every play. Other descriptions of the
jukebox assume that users will, for a price, be allowed to download and manipulate some number
of copies.
115. This is not to say that the pay-per-use model does not lurk in our future as the world
becomes more and more "connected" and the system continues to adapt, but the recent history of
the system suggests that an economically viable delivery system for music must allow some
degree of consumer manipulation and content sharing. See infra Part IV.F (discussing personal
uses).
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The RIAA has provided examples of unintended consequences for
actors attempting to control the course of system change. It sued to shut
down Napster and won, thereby channeling P2P development into more
decentralized systems which proved considerably more resistant to legal
control.1 6 As a result of that first unintended consequence, the RIAA
found itself compelled to sue individual users, a decision still producing
feedbacks in the system, but one that may already have had the
additional unintended consequence of reducing congressional support
for protective measures sought by the industry
17
P2P file sharing is already a good surprise for consumers and
technology providers, and may yet turn out to be a good surprise even
for the recording industry, as the videotape market was for the movie
industry. Its existence and the responses to it confirm that the intricate
concatenation of parts and processes which form the music system is
adapting to the transition from analog to digital media in a networked
world.
F. The Edge of Chaos
The critical question is whether the system has achieved the
productive tension between order and chaos that will make it most
resilient and sustainable in the long run. Clearly, a great deal of
experimentation with new methods of distribution is occurring and a
significant number are proving successful in the marketplace. The fact
that successful emergent models take a middle-ground approach offers
some hope that the system is successfully "tuning" itself to its new
environment. If the system has achieved the equipoise between stable,
linear behaviors and nonlinear behaviors typical of self-organized
criticality, we would expect to find power law distributions in response
to change. Professor Neil Netanel observes, in fact, that file sharing
activity follows a power law distribution, in that the large majority of
file sharing implicates a very small number of particularly popular
works.18 Music sales follow a similar distribution-a relatively small
number of hits produce the lion's share of sales. 19
116. See supra notes 83-84 (describing the recent litigation involving services such as
Napster, Aimster, etc.).
117. See Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV, 653, 665-
70 (2005) (observing that the industry has become more isolated on Capitol Hill since it began
suing consumers).
118. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose A Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow Free Peer-To-
Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 55-56 (2003) [hereinafter Netanel, Impose].
119. The record companies justify their pricing on the fact that most sound recordings lose
money. Consequently, the companies must collect enough profit on the few hits to cover their
losses on the large majority of recordings. WILLIAM W. FISHER, III, PROMISES TO KEEP 22
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The emergence of successful business models and existence of power
law distributions may indicate that the music system is poised at the
edge of chaos. Before Congress imposes new legal regulation, it would
seem prudent to seek empirical verification to the contrary-proof that
the system is in danger of slipping into chaos. The overall performance
of the music system should be evaluated.
Systems analysis provides a methodology for evaluation of system
performance. All systems have purposes or functions. In theory, an
observer can determine whether the system is healthy by determining
whether it achieves its goals. 20 The goals of the system as a whole are
distinct from the goals of system participants, whose particular goals
may conflict.'
21
The music system functions to enable creation of musical sound
recordings and to distribute recordings in relatively stable containers
such as CDs or MP3 files, or through transmitted performances of the
recording. As a necessary subsidiary to distribution, it was historically
necessary for producers to market recordings using techniques such as
122branding, advertising, sampling, and creation of fan communities.
Those goals are distinct from the goals of individual components of the
system. The recording studios may primarily seek to garner the highest
possible profit from their content; technology providers may seek to
profit from popular innovations; artists may seek to earn a living while
expressing their own creativity; consumers may seek entertainment at
the lowest possible cost. Obviously, these goals will sometimes conflict
without jeopardizing the goals of the system as a whole. Whether the
music system is healthy can be assessed by determining whether it
achieves its goals. At a more reductive level, we might inquire whether
particular processes function to support achievement of those goals. Do
producers, for example, receive sufficient incentives from the flow of
money through the system to assure continued production? Analysts
can identify system components and track inputs and outputs through
(2004).
120. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 485-87 (observing that systems analysis regards systems as
having purposes or functions).
121. Id. at 486. For example, in a capitalist economy, the goal of businesses may be to make
the highest profits, while the goal of consumers may be to find the cheapest deal. However,
traditional economists argue that the goal of the system as a whole is efficient allocation of
resources.
122. See Parikh, supra note 68 (depicting a concise view of industry structure and processes).
For a more comprehensive treatment, see RAPAPORT, supra note 68, at 1-6. See also, FISHER,
supra note 119, at 39-59, 82-133 (describing traditional industry structures and legal practices
and the recent technological developments that challenge them).
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the system processes in order to determine whether system goals are
being achieved.
As a highly simplified example, assume that Sarah, a singer-
songwriter, composes the music and writes the lyrics to a song. The
inputs for her creation of the song are likely to include not only her
musical skills, time, money, equipment, and so on, but also her
familiarity with a large repertoire of music previously created by others.
Further assume that after being contacted by a studio talent scout,
Sarah's agent lands her a recording contract. Her composition is an
output of her creative process, but also now an input into the system for
producing and distributing sound recordings.
As part of her recording deal, she probably transfers her copyrights in
both the musical composition and the recording to the studio and/or a
music publisher. The studio provides the inputs necessary to make and
preserve the sound recording (studios, backup musicians, physical
media, and the like) including digital technologies, many of which
originate from technology providers. Once the recording is made, the
studio will orchestrate the advertising and marketing services necessary
to promote the song, working with advertisers, radio stations,
webcasters, and so on. The output, the sound recording, will be
distributed to consumers through chains of online and offline retailers.
Licenses concerning performance rights for the recording may be
negotiated.123 All of these activities initiate the flow of money back
through the system to various participants including Sarah herself.
Once released, if not before, the song may also appear on file sharing
networks and be distributed through those channels.
The chief concern of observers, and strongest argument favoring the
recording industry, is that free distribution through file sharing will so
adversely affect sales that insufficient money will flow back through the
system to compensate producers for their inputs and provide them with
enough profit to encourage further creation. The systemic feedback
loop through which the flow of money stimulates new recordings, the
incentives loop, will be disrupted. Consequently, Sarah will write fewer
songs, the recording studios will produce fewer sound recordings, and
so on.
124
123. For visual representations of the many entities that may play a part in the music business,
see Parikh, supra note 68, at 2, 4, 7 (modeling current industry and changes introduced by the
Internet); RAPAPORT, supra note 68, at 2 (describing an artist-centered view).
124. Copyright regulation is primarily based on this assumed relationship between creative
expression and economic incentives.
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The connection between monetary incentives and creation has always
been attenuated with respect to artists, many of whom create for reasons
entirely divorced from money and most of whom receive little return
from sales of their recordings. 12  However, intermediaries like
recording studios and distributors have historically required profit
incentives. 26  Most empirical researchers to date have focused
exclusively on the question of whether file sharing prevents these
intermediaries from making sufficient profit to stay in business, thereby
threatening the incentives loop.
127
Recent surveys seek to establish or disprove correlations between
declining industry sales and rising file sharing. 28  Somewhat
surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence that either the music
system as a whole or the recording industry in particular is jeopardized
by file sharing. 29 Thus far, the surveys differ on the impact of P2P on
sales of music recordings; some finding a measurable impact on legal
sales, others finding no correlation between file sharing and sales. 3°
Economists disagree over the validity of different survey
methodologies, the impact of factors other than file sharing, and the
potentially positive impact of sampling on sales. 3 ' In particular,
economists are skeptical of the industry's claims that every free
download represents a lost sale since many downloaders would not pay
the industry asking price.'32 After several declining years, music sales
125. Recording artists are estimated to receive, on average, only 12% of the sales price of
legal online downloads and CDs. Many receive less as a result of studio deductions for
"packaging" and promotional copies. See Nancy Einhart, The MP3 Economy: How Labels and
Artists Divvy Up your MP3 dollar, BUSINESS 2.0,
http://www.business2.com/articles/mag/0,1640,49472,00.html (last modified June, 2003)
(describing the earnings from music sales); FISHER, supra note 119, at 259-62 (describing the
various entities and individuals who receive money when a CD is sold).
126. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction Of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 267 (2002).
127. Stan Liebowitz, Pitfalls in Measuring the Impact of File Sharing, 51 CES INFO. EcON.
STUD. 439, 440 (2005) [hereinafter Liebowitz, Pitfalls]. See also FISHER, supra note 119, at 31-
32 (discussing social costs if exploitation of new technological opportunities).
128. Michael Warnecke, Economists Spar Over Impact of File Sharing on Record Sales, 9
ELEC. COM. REP. (BNA) 568 (June 23, 2004).
129. Oberholzer & Strumpf, supra note 90.
130. Compare, e.g., Liebowitz, Pitfalls, supra note 127 (finding that file sharing adversely
impacts sales) with Oberholzer & Strumpf, supra note 90 (finding no statistical correlation
between file sharing and slumps in music sales).
131. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 33-34 (providing anecdotal evidence of an increase in
overall sales); see also Warnecke, supra note 128 (describing the debate regarding the impact of
file sharing on sales).
132. One recent study suggested that every 10 downloads may result in I or 2 lost sales, but
the researchers admitted that their sample was not representative. See Daniel Gross, Does a Free
Download Equal a Lost Sale?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at C4 (citing a study from the
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actually rose in 2004 despite file sharing.' 33 Further, all of these surveys
evaluate only the impact of file sharing on the traditional recording
industry, which is to say that they prove little about the state of the
music system as broadly defined herein.
34
There is, then, no empirical evidence establishing that the music
system as a whole no longer achieves its goals of producing and
distributing sound recordings. Indeed, there is little firm evidence that
even the recording studios are in immediate jeopardy as a result of file
sharing. The dearth of such negative evidence, when combined with the
positive indicators noted above, might logically be read to indicate that
the system as a whole is maintaining a healthy equipoise, though some
of its constituent parts may suffer losses as the system adapts. One
might lay those losses at least partially at the door of those complex
adaptive subsystems, the major studios, which seem to have abandoned
creativity in favor of calcification. Nonetheless, the file-sharing
phenomenon has created a furor, socially and politically, that has
inspired innumerable proposals to "fix" the system. 35 If we intend to
intervene legislatively in the workings of the music system, as now
seems likely, complexity theory offers some lessons as to the kinds of
regulation which may be successful and those which may do harm.
IV. LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION
Where humans are involved in complex systems, they inevitably
attempt to control the future path of the system. The promulgation of
laws is one, but not the only, mechanism employed to stabilize systems
and make their behavior more predictable. The legal system is often
used where other modalities of regulation, such as technology and social
norms, are unsuccessful.1 36  Given the dynamic qualities of complex
systems, the legal systems regulating them must, of necessity, evolve
National Bureau of Economic Research).
133. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 32 (reporting U.S. album sales losses in 2000-2003
ranging from just under 4% to almost 10%). However, CD sales rose in 2004. See Sean Daly, 10
Million iPods, Previewing the CD's End, WASH. POST, Feb. 13. 2005, at A01 (citing a Nielsen
Soundscan report that CD sales were up 2.3 % in 2004, while legal online sales rose 376 %).
134. No surveys have publicized data showing, for example, whether creative inputs to the
system are declining because artists must abandon their profession, whether fewer compositions
are being written or published, whether fewer new recordings are being made or distributed either
by studios or independently, or whether they are being distributed less widely.
135. See infra Part V (assessing current legislative proposal from a systems perspective).
136. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 490-91 (observing that formal lawmaking is, or should be,
the last resort for regulation of behavior).
[Vol. 37
2005] Systems Perspective on File Sharing
over time.137 Legal regimes set to regulate complex adaptive systems
may themselves display many characteristics of such systems.138
While other legal disciplines, notably contract law, play a role in the
music system, copyright law is the primary regulatory regime. In the
music system, social norms and legal rules are currently in conflict and
content owners' technological controls have failed to prevent
widespread file sharing. The market is in flux. Consequently, key
industry players have turned to Congress requesting that the existing
copyright regime, itself a complex system,
39 be revised.14°
In regulating, Congress should bear in mind the inherent
characteristics of complex systems as it considers alteration of copyright
rules in the digital environment.' 4 ' A central lesson of complexity
theory is that the behaviors of complex systems are difficult, if not
impossible, for human beings to fully comprehend, much less predict.
Legislators should therefore proceed cautiously and should attempt to
create rules that promote long-term sustainability of the music system.
This Part suggests some guidelines for regulators who seek to reform
or replace the copyright regime in order to regulate music file sharing.
Complexity theory and systems analysis suggest generally that
regulators142 should consider the system as a whole; try to foster
emergence; establish simple legal rules; expect and allow surprises; take
a longer temporal view; and be prepared to tinker repeatedly with the
137. A number of writers have explored in depth the jurisprudential implications of
evolutionary science for legal theory. They emphasize the law's responsiveness, slow though it
may be, to changes in the political, social, and economic systems with which law interacts. See,
e.g., E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition of Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38
(1985) (discussing evolutionary theories of law); Geu, supra note 9; Herbert Hovenkamp,
Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985) (using Darwinian models to
explain changes in the law); Roe, supra note 9 (putting evolutionary theory in the context of law
and economics); Ruh], Fitness, supra note 80 (describing how communities coevolve toward the
edge of chaos). This Article takes as a given that law changes over time in response to changes in
society. Susan Crawford asserts that law is itself an emergent phenomenon produced by the
social system. See Crawford, supra note 9, at 645 (discussing the theoretical nature of law). It
would, then, represent a situation in which an emergent property of a complex adaptive system is
itself a complex adaptive system.
138. "Law is best thought of as an element of law-related systems and a technique by which
governments can intervene in those systems." LoPucki, supra note 2, at 491.
139. The copyright regime can be shown to display the characteristics of complex structure,
nonlinear behavior, coevolution, emergence, and unpredictability. Whether it achieves its goals is
much-debated question. Extended discussion of copyright as a complex system is reserved for a
different article.
140. Regarding recent legislative initiatives, see infra Part IV.
141. See supra Part II.A-F (discussing complex systems).
142. "Regulators" refers primarily to Congress. Most of the current proposals for copyright
reform involve legislative restructuring of the regime. Obviously, courts also influence the
development of the regime and these guidelines may be useful in judicial interpretation.
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legal regime. Additionally, the history of the music system suggests
that personal use is an important component. As legislators consider the
many specific proposals for regulating file sharing, adherence to the
guidelines proposed below may produce a music system better able to
achieve its goal of facilitating the creation and distribution of sound
recordings.
A. Consider the System as a Whole
Technological delivery systems and socio-cultural practices like
music sharing are important parts of the same music system that
encompasses the recording studios and their distribution chains.
Regulators should seek to promote the continuing health of all system
components by maintaining a balance among ther . The technology
subsystem should not be crippled, for example, through imposition of
technology mandates, in order to preserve existing structures in the
market subsystem.143 Equally, technology-supported, socio-cultural
sharing norms cannot be allowed to destroy incentives to creativity.
The traditional copyright balance of incentives and dissemination is
certainly part of this equation, but its utilitarian focus tends to
overemphasize markets and undervalue the importance of technological
innovation and social norms, as if those considerations were not only
outside copyright's scope, but irrelevant to the creation and
dissemination of copyrightable works. Economic cost-benefit analyses
focused only on music content markets and the current players in them
represent the traditional, reductive approach to systems problems. Such
an approach inevitably misses or misunderstands important forces at
work in the system. 144
143. From a purely economic standpoint, it would be extremely foolish to hamper technology
in order to protect content owners. Technology industries have been the chief engine of
economic growth in the last decade and contribute a much larger share than content industries,
like the movie and recording industries, to the gross domestic product. See Crawford, supra note
9, at 635 (observing IT-producing industries' effects on the economy); 2004 Consumer
Electronics Sales to Top 2003 Record, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Sept. 7, 2004, http://www.reed-
electronics.com/electronicnews/article/CA451197 (reporting that 2003 sales of consumer
electronics exceeded $100 billion and forecasting sales exceeding $108 in 2004); RIAA, PRESS
ROOM, Research and Data, http://www.riaa.com/news/marketingdata/default.asp (last visited
July 7, 2005) (pegging worldwide music sales at $40 billion, one third of which was attributable
to the U.S. recording industry).
144. Congress is empowered, under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to the authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. This mandate
encompasses two goals: inducing creation by providing incentives to creators and encouraging
dissemination of works to the public in order to facilitate follow-on creation and create an
educated citizenry capable of participating fully in the democratic dialogue. The quinitisentially
utilitarian constitutional provision lends itself readily to economic cost-benefit analysis which
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The Supreme Court's deepest insights in the Sony Betamax case'4 5
were its expressed conviction that technological innovation should not
be quashed at the behest of copyright owners and its unspoken, but
evident, reluctance to criminalize widely accepted social behavior.
Subsequent history established the wisdom of the Court's refusal to
favor copyright over innovation as the Sony doctrine allowed rapid
development of useful new technologies and, ironically, of lucrative
markets for copyright owners. 146
Regulators must also bear in mind that the music system is a global
system. Regulation in this country will have consequences worldwide.
There is some indication that, like new business models, global patterns
of legal regulation through treaties and directives are emerging.
47
Those forms of regulation, like regulation through laws promulgated in
the U.S. Congress, will be most effective if based on a holistic approach
acknowledging the inherent dynamics of the system.'48
B. Foster Emergence
In so far as possible, regulators should seek to encourage emergent,
bottom-up solutions before imposing top-down solutions. Brian Arthur,
a complexity economist, notes with respect to economic regulation:
"[G]overnments should avoid both extremes of coercing a desired
outcome or keeping strict hands off, and instead seek to push the system
gently toward favored structures that can grow and emerge naturally.
often fail to reflect noncommodifiable but nonetheless important expressive interests. This is a
common failing of cost-benefit analysis. See Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 28, at 479-480 (criticizing
cost-benefit analysis as inaccurate in determining the costs and benefits associated with different
laws because it does not account for unexpected effects of those laws).
145. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440--442 (1984),
the Court refused to enjoin Sony from manufacturing and distributing VCRs because they could
be used to make infringing copies of movies and other television programming. Borrowing from
patent law, the court adopted the staple article of commerce doctrine holding that makers of
technologies capable of substantial noninfringing uses could not be found liable for contributory
copyright infringement. That doctrine was most recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2786 (2005). Borrowing
again from patent law, the court also adopted a standard for active inducement of infringement in
cases, unlike Sony, where intent to induce infringement could be established. Id. at 2780.
146. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1387 n.127 (2004) (discussing the
unexpected opportunities for copyright owners coming from radio and VHS).
147. See ITUNES WHITE PAPER, supra note 102, at 82-86 (comparing and contrasting the
various international approaches to digital media regulation).
148. Susan Crawford suggests that monolithic, global harmonization of copyright law may not
be a good adaptive strategy within this broader context. Rather, copyright law that varies from
country to country may allow greater variation and experimentation, hence greater adaptability to
change. See Crawford, supra note 9, at 646-47 (advocating a balanced approach to copyright
legislation).
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Not a heavy hand, not an invisible hand, but a nudging hand."' 149 Top-
down solutions, no matter how well-intentioned, rely on inherently
unreliable predictions about future system evolution. They may, in fact,
divert it from the optimal path and create a path dependence scenario in
which, for example, imposition of an administrative model precludes
development of more efficient business models. 50 Not all emergent
behaviors may prove desirable, but they have the unarguable advantage
of representing responses to actual system conditions. Apple iTunes
proves something about sustainability of a certain business model in the
current system. If such a model proves successful, legal incentives can
be fashioned to encourage it.
C. Use Simple Rules
A number of commentators 51 have pushed for simplification of the
complex quagmire of current copyright laws. The laws governing
music are notable, even among copyright laws, for their
incomprehensibility. Industry players have learned to work within a
system of which one executive opined, "[i]t's as if Franz Kafka
designed this system and employed Rube Goldberg as his architect."'52
Consumers and many artists are baffled by it. In a globally
interconnected system where direct interactions frequently occur among
149. Arthur, supra note 9, at 108.
150. The concept of path dependence, which arises from chaos and complexity theories,
suggests that an initial advantage for a technology or standard may, because of sensitivity to
initial conditions and historical "lock-in," have important, irreversible effects even in free
markets. If so, the efficiency-maximizing effects of the "invisible" hand may fail to emerge,
possibly resulting in market failure. The standard example cited for path dependence is the
QWERTY keyboard, claimed to be less efficient than other keyboard configurations, but
universally used because, as a historical matter, the large majority of keyboard users learned to
type on the QWERTY system. Natural resistance to learning another system created a classic
positive feedback loop in which the QWERTY configuration was adopted by a critical mass of
users and became the industry standard. Economists differ vociferously over whether irreversible
path dependence occurs or whether markets invariably adjust over time to produce more efficient
solutions. Brian Arthur, who developed the economic theory of increasing returns, is the leading
voice for "positive feedback" economics. See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies,
Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 EcON. J. 116 (1989) (discussing
increasing returns theory as opposed to diminishing returns); W. Brian Arthur, Positive
Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92-99 (1990) (arguing for the positive feedback theory
observed in high-technology economies); but see, S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Path
Dependence, Lock-In, and History, J. L. ECON. & ORG. Apr. 1995 (arguing that empirical and
theoretical support for path dependency is weak and disputing the QWERTY keyboard example).
151. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 74, at 292-93 (proposing changes in the rules for copyright
terms); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 179-182 (2001) (arguing that copyright laws
should be simplified in order for the public to understand and obey the laws).
152. Rob Glaser, quoted in Amy Harmon, Copyright Hurdles Confront Selling of Music on
the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 23, 2002, at Cl.
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artists, distributors and consumers, relatively simple rules
understandable by ordinary people are desirable as a purely practical
matter. Complexity theory teaches that complex, adaptive behaviors
can emerge even from simple rules.
Indeed, some theorists argue that too much structural complexity (too
much order) not only produces diminishing returns, but may even
contribute to system collapse. 153  They posit a cycle in which society
responds to failure of one law by creating more law to patch the
problem, thereby adding to the structural complexity of the legal
system, which contributes to system vulnerability, causing more laws to
fail, and so on. 5 4 Certainly, Congress has subjected copyright law to
considerable patching up over the years, much of it in the form of
extraordinarily complex, industry-negotiated "solutions" to problems
created by new technologies. 55  Notwithstanding the piling on of such
new laws, proposals for abandoning the regime as nonfunctional, at
least in digital environments, are increasingly common. 156 Any new rule
sets should aim for simplicity in both formulation and administration.
D. Expect and Allow Surprises
Complexity theory indicates that, because of the inherent
unpredictability of complex adaptive systems, attempts to regulate them
are likely to result in unintended consequences.157 It also indicates that
the most sustainable systems must maintain a balance between ordered
and chaotic behaviors. These principles suggest, somewhat
paradoxically, that regulators should try to anticipate unintended
consequences of any new regulation but, nonetheless, build a regulatory
structure that permits some degree of disorder to persist.
153. See Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 28, at 466-68 (observing that, in adaptive systems not
regulated by humans, the periodic shedding of overly-complex structures is a significant aspect of
adaptation). Human intervention often prevents the functioning of such safety valves in socio-
legal systems. Id. at 469. Ruhl & Ruhl propose that lawmakers should exercise a form of self-
organized criticality and allow some societal problems to develop without resort to law, providing
an opportunity for other problem-solving mechanisms to work. Id. at 475-77. Kauffman applies
the law of diminishing returns to cycles of technological development. KAUFFMAN, supra note 9,
at 203. See also, JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 78 (observing that even natural systems can become
unwieldy when their component parts become excessively complicated).
154. See Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 28, at 450-52 (discussing the structural complexity of the
federal administrative system).
155. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000)
(prohibiting circumvention of copy protection technologies).
156. See infra Parts V.A-E (assessing the current proposals for copyright law from a complex
systems perspective).
157. See supra Part II.E (discussing the unpredictable nature of the music industry as a
complex system).
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If straightforward cause-effect relationships did not hold true
most of the time, regulation of any kind would be impossible. Even in
complex systems, local rules may often produce predictable behavior at
the local level, though they cannot predict emergent qualities.
Complexity theory simply raises a cautionary flag that regulators must
expect the system to throw them a few curves as a natural outcome of
system dynamics. In the music system, attempts to control the impact
of P2P networks will set off a cascade of change throughout the system,
producing unintended consequences of various magnitudes. Regulators
should attempt to anticipate the indirect consequences of regulation,
while accepting that they simply cannot predict the full complement of
responses likely to occur.
A regulatory approach that allows some degree of unpredictability in
the regulated system runs counter to the traditional goal of lawmaking
to assure predictability and stability. Nonetheless, complexity theory
suggests that, in the long term, the most successful regulatory scheme
must leave room for surprises, both good and bad. We must accept
some indeterminacy in the legal system, just as complexity economists
argue that we must recognize indeterminacy in economic systems,1
58
and physicists have come to accept indeterminacy in physical
systems. 5 9 Systems that are too ordered and integrated are fragile, not
flexible.160
The idea of maintaining a mix of order and chaos, control and
freedom, within a system, is largely consistent with the traditionally
porous protection offered by copyright law. Copyright offers only a
limited package of rights for a limited amount of time, allowing works
eventually to enter the public domain where they may be freely used by
consumers or future creators.16' Even during the copyright monopoly,
doctrines such as fair use, first sale, and the idea-expression dichotomy
158. See W. Brian Arthur, The End of Certainty in Economics, Address at the Conference
Einstein Meets Magritte (July, 1994) in EINSTEIN MEETS MAGRITTE (D. Aerts, et al, eds. 1999),
available at http://www.santafe.edu/arthur/Papers/Papers.html (discussing the indeterminancy of
the economy because of human behavior and technology).
159. See BAK, supra note 9, at 8, 11 (discussing that fields such as quantum mechanics and
string theory are highly probabilistic).
160. Jervis notes that such systems "can neither take advantage of unforeseen opportunities
nor cope with unexpected difficulties." JERVIS, supra note 9, at 294.
161. Copyright owners receive rights to control reproduction, adaptation, distribution, public
performance and display, and in the case of sound recording, public performance by digital
transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). These rights are limited in duration under 17 U.S.C. § 302
and subject to many exceptions codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122. The Framers were themselves
the beneficiaries of fairly loose copyright laws in what was, at the time, a nation more likely to
pirate copyrighted works than to protect them.
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provide substantial loopholes for the escape of works into public use.
16 2
Both the likelihood of unintended consequences and the importance of
retaining flexibility in the system reinforce the suggestion that
regulation with a light hand is advisable. Such regulation will require
patience and ongoing monitoring of system responses.
E. Allow the System Time to Respond
In the era of short attention spans and thirty-second sound bites,
complexity theory requires recognition of the importance of longer,
evolutionary time scales in system development. Technological
innovation has proceeded at light speed over the past decade. The
music system as a whole may need more time than has elapsed thus far
to cope with the changes wrought by digitization and global networking.
Not only law but markets, cultural practices and the political process
naturally move at slower paces than technology; the delay in their
responses to innovation may serve an adaptive purpose by allowing
emergence to occur. 163
If legislators regulate only in light of present circumstances, without
a view toward future developments, they may lock down the music
system in ways that render it maladaptive in the long run. For example,
successful imposition of draconian DRM schemes several years ago
might have precluded Apple from developing its more liberal DRM
regime and from negotiating licenses that allow considerably more
freedom to consumers than proponents of the pay-per-use world
advocate. Because the law responded slowly, windows of opportunity
were opened for Napster and its successors and, subsequently, for
iTunes and its imitators. We should be wary that the urge to regulate
quickly, promoted forcefully by those invested in the past and driven by
162. Fair use, codified as 17 U.S.C. §107, potentially provides protection for some uses,
particularly those that foster democratic dialog, such as educational and critical uses. The
doctrine functions as an affirmative defense that immunizes certain unauthorized uses of
copyrighted works from infringement suits based on a complicated, four-factor balancing test.
Application of the doctrine to specific uses is notoriously unpredictable. The first sale doctrine,
17 U.S.C. § 109, limits the copyright owner's control over distribution to control over the first
sale of a copy, thereby freely allowing subsequent transfers of purchased copies. The idea-
expression dichotomy prevents copyright protection for ideas, methods, processes, and similar
abstract concepts, providing protection only for particularized expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2000). All three doctrines serve to make copyrighted works, or certain aspects of them, available
for public use.
163. For example, by the time the courts shut down Napster (see A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (granting a preliminary injunction against Napster)),
technology had already moved on to decentralized file sharing systems, which are still in
operation pending the lower court's review under the new inducement standard announced by the
Supreme Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
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the desire for short-term profit, may outpace the system's own dynamics
which would produce better real-world solutions if given time.
Once a regulatory strategy is adopted, flexibility will be required on
the part of regulators. They will be able to anticipate some
consequences of their interventions, but not others. The only way to
learn how the music system will respond to new legal rules is to set it in
motion and wait to see what happens. Regulators should expect to
employ multiple, sequential strategies to retune the system as
unexpected responses to their initial regulation, and unexpected
responses to the responses, manifest themselves in the system.
As a final cautionary note, during that process of tinkering with the
system, regulators should accept the irreversibility of change. The
RIAA currently seeks to protect its old business models and its
dominant role in distribution. Those models fit an environment in
which the necessity of producing and distributing physical copies of
sound recordings imposed costs and geographic constraints that no
longer apply in the online environment. In the new environment, there
is no particular reason that Congress should abet the recording
industry's attempt to maintain the dominant position it held in music
distribution prior to the advent of file sharing systems. The industry
still serves an important role in the system, particularly with respect to
offline distribution of physical copies. However, the recording studios
may ultimately have to adjust to a less dominant role, with a greater
percentage of distribution controlled through new players like
independent online services and direct artist-to-consumer enterprises. 64
Some industry players, such as retail outlets, may become extinct in the
new digital environment or they may take new forms. 65  The heady
days of old Napster and unlimited music sharing for free and without
penalty are also rapidly departing and unlikely to be recaptured though
it appears likely that more limited forms of personal use will, and
should, survive.
164. In the context of international politics, Jervis refers to this as the "cycle of hubris and
nemesis" in which dominant actors in the old environment must adjust to a much smaller role in
the new. JERVIS, supra note 9, at 144. The Berkman Center study observes that because of the
manufacturing and distribution cost savings associated with online music sales, record labels may
end up with revenues roughly comparable to those realized under traditional "offline" sales. See
ITUNES WHITE PAPER, supra note 102, at 88 (forecasting the potential effects on record labels of
online music stores).
165. See e.g., Nat Ives, Musicland Tries to Embrace the Internet and Imulate the Atmosphere
of Retail Chains like Starbucks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at C9 (describing experimental
concepts for retail outlets).
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F. Permit Personal Use
The phrase "personal use" includes consumption and convenience
copying of recordings by users for purposes that include portability to
other devices, adaptations such as the creation of "mix" CDs and MP3
playlists and uncompensated sharing of both the original works and the
adapted works with others. 166 Traditional copyright allowed such uses
partly by design but mostly by default. Recent developments suggest
that those uses play an important role within the music system by
providing the input and outlet for much musical creativity.
The Copyright Act contains no general exemption for personal use
though it offers some protection under doctrines like fair use, first sale,
and the idea-expression dichotomy, which generally limit the rights of
167copyright owners. It does provide one specific exemption for home
audio taping under the Audio Home Recording Act, 68 but the act has
been held inapplicable to general purpose computers and peripheral
music players.' 69 Apart from such doctrines, personal uses always
existed de facto, assumed though not specifically acknowledged. Even
prior to the digital revolution, music consumers commonly taped
duplicate copies of recordings or created "mix" tapes of favorite audio
tracks that they shared with friends or family. Copyright owners
166. Definitions of "personal use" in copyright vary from restrictive readings allowing a
single copy made for the individual's own use to broader readings which include some degree of
sharing with family and friends. For a restrictive reading, see L. RAY PATrERSON & STANLEY
W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 193-99 (1991)
(restricting the term to actual use of the work and the making of a single copy which is not a
functional substitute for a copyrighted work). Copying of functional works, such as computer
programs, would fall within fair use, not personal use. In a more recent article, Patterson argues
that personal use so defined is constitutionally required. L. Ray Patterson & Christopher M.
Thomas, Personal Use In Copyright Law: An Unrecognized Constitutional Right, 50 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 475, 481-84 (2003). For a broader reading, see Michael J. Meurer,
Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF.
L. REv. 845, 865 n.95 (1997) (including sharing, modification, archiving, browsing, and the
creation of derivative works for personal use). This article adopts this broader definition which
was also adopted in an earlier article on this subject. See Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to
Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (2001) (defining personal
use).
167. Some "personal" uses qualify as "fair" uses under the complex, four factor analysis of 17
U.S.C. § 107, others likely would not. Compare Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 454-56 (1984) (holding that noncommercial home videotaping of television broadcasts
for purposes of timeshifting was a fair use) with Patterson & Thomas, supra note 166, at 504-05
(arguing the 1976 codification of the fair use doctrine melded personal use into fair use with the
intention of restricting both fair and personal uses).
168. Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
169. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Rio music player did not fall within Audio Home Recording
Act).
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tolerated such uses because users' copying activities were difficult to
detect and had limited market impact. 170 Moreover, providers of
copying technologies offered far more attractive targets for
infringement suits than individual consumers.1
7 1
The development of digital media, combined with network
interconnection, altered this state of affairs. Not only could consumers
disseminate large numbers of perfect digital copies far outside their own
circle of friends through email and file sharing, but they also began to
reformat works for use on different digital devices. Because of the
vastly increased scale of activity, consumer sharing became more
dangerous to copyright owners' markets as the technology
simultaneously made it more detectible. 72 The lower court decisions in
the Grokster case 17  appeared to limit copyright's usefulness as a
weapon against facilitators, inspiring the industry to launch direct suits
• 174
against consumers.
Notwithstanding the lack of explicit statutory recognition, personal
uses contribute to achievement of copyright's goals. Personal uses of
many kinds of copyrighted works, including music, enrich private lives
and public culture and provide the raw materials for new works. 175 They
constitute a significant element of what Professor Lawrence Lessig has
dubbed "remix," meaning the practice of taking pre-existing ideas and
expression and making something new from them.176  The ability to
170. See Patterson & Thomas, supra note 166, at 506 (discussing why personal use was so
easily excused by the courts).
171. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A.
1, 11-12 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of private copying); Pamela
Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form:
The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1993) (discussing several
Supreme Court decisions involving copyright infringement suits against providers of copying
technologies).
172. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
299-300 (1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright] (discussing reaction to sharing by hand copying
in contrast to the reaction to electronic methods of copying).
173. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
Cal. 2003), aff'd 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
The lower courts found no secondary liability for purveyors of decentralized file sharing
software. The Supreme Court later reversed and remanded for review under its newly-announced
"inducement" standard. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780-83.
174. See Von Lohman, supra note 86 (noting that thousands of such suits have been brought).
175. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 283-89 (1996) (discussing
personal uses in cyberspace); Netanel, Copyright, supra note 172 (discussing the extension of
copyright to the personal use of cultural products).
176. See M. Marshall, Remix is a Cultural Right, Lessig Says (Nov. 18, 2004) (on file with
author).
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share and play with works, as well as to passively enjoy them,
contributes to creativity and semiotic democracy.
The iTunes business model offers one solution to the personal use
quandary; it legitimates such activities but also limits their scope by
licensing them and imposing reasonable technological restraints on
copying and sharing.'77 In this way, it mimics the state of affairs that
existed under the copyright regime prior to the digital revolution by
creating a limited sphere of allowable personal uses conducive to both
creator incentives and semiotic democracy. The success of iTunes
indicates that personal use has market value. 178  Where competition
exists in the market, consumers have rejected draconian copy-
protection 179 but embraced more limited forms of copy control. The
success of iTunes suggests that any pay service wishing to succeed in
the post-Napster environment must provide some scope for personal
uses as well as some protection for content owners.
A complex systems perspective ratifies this strategy. Complexity
theory indicates that the most viable complex systems achieve a balance
between order and chaos. Copyright monopolies and rules generally act
as forces of order within the regulated industries, regularizing the flow
of works and incentives. Unauthorized noncommercial uses contribute
to creative disorder by permitting unanticipated, creative uses of works
that would be less accessible, and hence less usable by subsequent
creators, in a strictly controlled system."0 Additionally, personal uses
prevent copyright owners from obtaining such rigid control of the music
system that the system becomes incapable of adaptation to change.
Copyright's refusal, and practical inability, to provide owners with
complete control has contributed to the long-term health of the creative
systems it regulates. If kept within bounds, personal use poses no threat
to the incentives feedback loop and contributes to the inherently messy
creative process. The most successful regulations should then permit
some degree of unauthorized, noncommercial use.
In summary, the best legislative strategy for regulating the complex
music system would balance competing economic, technological, and
177. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (discussing the success of iTunes).
178. Id.
179. For example, Circuit City's Divx system of copy control for movies was a complete
failure ultimately abandoned by the company. See Lindsay Arent, Ding Dong, Divx is Dead,
WIRED NEWS, June 16, 1999, http://wired-vig.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,20253,00.html
(discussing the downfall of Divx).
180. Michael Madison has suggested, in the context of fair use analysis, that creativity may be
viewed as an "emergent property of a complex system." Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented
Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1684 (2004).
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social interests, nudge the system toward emergence, provide a flexible
framework to accommodate new technologies, permit personal use and
give the system time to adjust before and between legislative
interventions. The next Part applies these general guidelines to current
copyright reform proposals in order to determine whether each proposal
is sufficiently in tune with the dynamics of complex systems to be
successful.
V. ASSESSING CURRENT PROPOSALS FROM A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
Until recently, most proposals for legal action to "fix" the music
"problem" created by file sharing came from two extremes in the
debate. High protectionists pursued proposals designed to produce a
pay-per-use regime for digital music while low protectionists suggested
abandonment of copyright altogether.18 A number of recent proposals
seek a middle ground. 82 This Part applies the guidelines just discussed
to several current models for regulation of the music system: (1)
copyright abandonment, (2) compulsory levies, (3) regulation as a
public utility, (4) pay-per-use, and (5) voluntary experiments and speed
bumps. 18 3 Each proposal starts from the current baseline in which the
copyright regime and related anti-circumvention laws apply to online
distribution of sound recordings, but enforcement is spotty and content
providers employ DRM schemes and restrictive licensing with variable
success. 84 Ultimately, all of these proposals share a common failing-impatience.
181. See infra Parts V.A, V.D (discussing pay-per-use and copyright abandonment proposals).
182. See infra Parts V.B, V.C, V.E (evaluating several alternative proposals).
183. The iTunes White Paper offers the following categories of proposals: (1) no change
scenario (current copyright and DMCA regimes continue to govern), (2) speed bumps scenario
(technological restrictions create small barriers), (3) technology lockdown scenario (restrictive
DRM schemes unilaterally determine users' rights), (4) alternative compensation scenario (state-
run taxing program implemented) and (5) entertainment cooperatives scenario (voluntary
associations control distribution). ITUNES WHITE PAPER, supra note 102, at 6, 7. A year earlier,
a Berkman Center study offered slightly different categories: (1) No Change, (2) Take Property
Rights Seriously (legal reforms to expand protection of intellectual property), (3) Effective
Technology Defense (digital rights management), (4) Utility Model (treating digital information
as a public utility), and (5) the compulsory license scenario (alternative compensation schemes).
The Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Five Scenarios for Digital Media in a Post-Napster
World, Research Publication No. 2003-07, Nov. 2003, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/2003-
07 [hereinafter Berkman Center, Scenarios]. Peter Yu categorizes recent models as mass
licensing (the iTunes model), compulsory licensing, voluntary collective licensing, voluntary
contribution, technological protection, copyright law revision, dispute resolution, and alternative
compensation. Yu, supra note 117, at 657. This article includes most of these scenarios in the
categories noted above, which are based not on the methodology of control but on the degree of
control sought.
184. See supra Part II.D (discussing the emergence of file sharing technology and various
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A. Copyright Abandonment
Some commentators urge that copyright protection for sound
recordings disseminated online is unnecessary in light of the new
economics of digital distribution. Digital networks permit near-costless
transmission of content and eliminate the need to distribute physical
copies through expensive bricks-and-mortar stores. Consequently,
digital networks also eliminate the need to provide incentives for
distributors. Since low-cost digital technologies enable artists to
produce their own recordings and sell them directly via the Internet,
many of the production and promotional services provided by recording
studios are no longer necessary. Since recording artists receive
economic incentives primarily from alternative forms of compensation
rather than from recording sales, there is no need for copyright
incentives. Copyright would continue to govern analog distribution of
works, but could be abandoned in online environments. '85
Copyright abandonment would certainly permit emergence, simplify
the rules for users and produce an unstructured legal environment
conducive to new developments. It would support not merely limited
personal use, but widespread, uncontrolled sharing. From a systems
perspective, copyright abandonment faces two obstacles: one that makes
it unwise and another that makes it unlikely.
186
Rejection of substantive legal regulation of online distribution
unwisely presumes that market dynamics will inevitably produce good
emergent behaviors. Harsh experience teaches that the dynamics of
complex systems can produce normatively undesirable emergent
behaviors. Free markets, which would provide the only mechanism of
change in a no-copyright system, have known defects. The invisible
responses to that technology).
185. Professor Raymond Shih Ray Ku argues that digital distribution eliminates the need to
provide incentives for intermediaries because it forces consumers to internalize the costs of
copying. Copyright incentives are not necessary to induce creation of music by artists since they
make their money primarily through concert ticket sales and the sale of associated goods like T-
shirts. Ku, supra note 126, at 306-10. But see Lemley & Reese, supra note 146, at 1378, n. 127
(2003) (rebutting Prof. Ku's argument). Tom Bell suggests that copyright owners should be
forced to choose either copyright protection or reliance on a combination of technological self-
help and common law remedies. Tom W. Bell, Escape From Copyright: Market Success vs.
Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 744-46 (2001).
For early alternative compensation proposals, John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED,
Mar. 1994, at 84, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html
(discussing approaches to regulating digital property); Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED,
July 1995, at 136, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.07/dyson.html (arguing
that digital content should be free).
186. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text (discussing obstacles faced by copyright
abandonment approach).
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hand does not always distribute its largesse equitably: markets produce
imbalances of power and information; monopolies and oligopolies
distort market function; externalities are imposed; markets may fail
entirely where transaction costs are high.
A complete laissez-faire approach to the music system poses similar
dangers. A single music distributor controlling the dominant technical
standard might gain monopoly power, and with it, the ability to use
DRM and license restrictions to control pricing and eliminate personal
uses. Conversely, the ethos of free sharing might become so entrenched
that no online business could succeed and creator incentives would be
eliminated. In other words, complete deregulation threatens to produce
an imbalance among the economic, technological, and social
subsystems. The lesson taken from complexity theory is not rejection
of all regulation, but due attention to the possibility of indirect as well
as direct effects.
8 7
The second barrier, which makes copyright abandonment unlikely, is
a form of path dependence. Holmes argued that the law follows a path
in which its past exerts strong influence over its future. 8  More
recently, scholars applying complexity and chaos theories have
theorized that law is path dependent in that past regulatory choices
foreclose certain options, producing a branching of law's path, and that
such foreclosure may be irreversible. 189  Copyright and related laws
have regulated the music system for a substantial period of time. Courts
have already applied the copyright regime, without hesitation, to online
distribution of music and will not reverse course absent explicit
direction to that effect from Congress. 190 Since the music industry
wields significant political power, Congress is exceedingly unlikely to
deconstruct the complicated edifice of copyright law without providing
substitute regulations and revenues for current industry players. A
copyright abandonment approach is, therefore, the least likely of all
187. See JERVIS, supra note 9, at 71-73 (rejecting the argument that regulation is always
futile).
188. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457-58 (1897)
(arguing that new laws develop as incremental outgrowths of previously established legal
principles so that the law's present and future paths depend on its past path).
189. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 9, at 643-44 (applying to law principles of sensitivity to initial
conditions, path dependence, and modem evolutionary theory); Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 28, at
415-16 (arguing that once a regulatory choice is made, it changes the socio-legal environment. If
society later wishes to change the direction of the law, it may take a regulatory turn back towards
a foregone option, but cannot retrace its path exactly).
190. For example, neither the parties nor the courts in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) and Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct.
2764 (2005) questioned the applicability of copyright law to online music distribution.
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possible scenarios. Realistically, the question is not whether the music
distribution system will be regulated, but how it will be regulated. Of
the outstanding proposals, compulsory levies have recently attracted the
most attention.
B. Compulsory Levies
A number of authors have proposed the imposition of compulsory
taxes or levies on the sale of software, devices or services used for
purposes of copyright infringement.1 91 The resulting funds would be
distributed to copyright owners to compensate them for activities like
unauthorized online file sharing. Levies would act as blanket
compulsory licenses, allowing users to make and share copies at will.
92
The proposals vary somewhat as to scope, their relationship to
copyright, and the means for collecting and distributing royalties, but all
trade off a levy for unrestricted file sharing. 93
191. See infra note 196 (discussing proposals for compulsory levies or taxes).
192. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 119, at 199-258 (2004). Professor Fisher proposes that
major portions of the copyright and anti-circumvention regimes be replaced by a government-
administered system under which revenues collected either through direct income taxation or
through levies on equipment and media would be distributed on the basis of frequency of use of
particular works. Usage would be tracked through unique registration numbers issued by the
Copyright Office. Once this system was established, copyright prohibitions against copying,
adaptation, performance, and distribution by users would be eliminated. Id. Professor Netanel
proposes imposition of a "noncommercial use levy" (NUL) on consumer products and services
whose value is enhanced by P2P sharing in return for allowing unrestricted noncommercial file
sharing. Collective societies representing copyright owners would distribute funds based on
usage. Netanel, Impose, supra note 118, at 37-47; see also Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing,
27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 1, 41-50 (2005) (advocating a levy with opt-out provision);
Glynn S. Lunney Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REv. 813, 852-58, 911-18 (2001) (supporting a
levy on devices and blank media). Professor Ku proposes a compulsory taxation scheme as an
alternative if his preferred position abolishing copyright altogether for digital works fails to
generate sufficient incentives for creation. Ku, supra note 126, at 312-15.
193. For example, Professor Fisher's scheme would ultimately replace copyright, Professor
Netanel's scheme would supplement it for certain kinds of digital works, and Professor Ku's
scheme would eliminate it as to digital recordings but retain it for analog recordings as long as
recordings were issued in both formats. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 246, 247; Ku, supra note
126, at 312-15, 321-22; Netanel, Impose, supra note 118, at 37-47. In this country, precedent
for a levy system is supplied by the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) which imposes a
royalty on blank digital audio media and digital audio recorders, and allocates the resulting
revenues among music copyright owners. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000). AHRA has been
rarely used because it applies narrowly to a digital audio recording format, DAT, which was
quickly replaced by digital CDs. Canada and a number of European countries use compulsory
levy systems. John Borland, Canada Deems P2P Downloading Legal, C/NET NEwS.coM, Dec.
12, 2003, http://news.com.com/Canada+deems+P2P+downloading+legal/2100-1025_3-
5121479.html (describing the Copyright Board's application of a pre-existing levy on recording
media to MP3 players and declared that downloading, though not necessarily uploading, was
legal). A recent report recommends that European countries move away from levies with respect
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From a systems perspective, a compulsory levy scheme certainly
offers some advantages. It considers the system as a whole and
attempts to keep the subsystems in balance by avoiding technology
mandates. It preserves incentives for creation by distributing royalties,
but also fosters semiotic democracy by legalizing copying and sharing.
It produces simple, understandable rules for users who gain "free" use
of a tremendous catalog of works without fear of legal liability. Most
compulsory levy schemes anticipate evolution over time in the sense
that they provide some mechanism for adjusting royalties.
On the other hand, compulsory levy proposals are top-down
solutions, which may both preclude emergence of new, desirable
business models and severely hamper models that have already
emerged. It is difficult to imagine iTunes thriving in a compulsory levy
environment. Who would pay to download rights-managed music after
paying the levy for the right to free use of music? Levy proposals seem
particularly vulnerable to the law of unintended consequences since
their designers cannot possibly anticipate the many effects such an
alteration in the legal rules will cause in the system as a whole. For
example, though levies do not directly impose or prohibit specific
technologies, the mere existence of the levy may indirectly channel
technological development.194 While levy systems provide simple rules
for users, they require complicated administrative oversight to adjust
royalty rates and distributions. 195 Those rules will be anything but
simple, and adjustments are likely to prove increasingly difficult over
time without markets to guide price setting.
196
to digital information. Bernt Hugenholtz, Lucie Guibault & Sjoerd van Geffen, The Future of
Levies in a Digital Environment: Final Report (2003), available at http://
www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM&levies-report.pdf. The report recommends that levies not
be applied to general purpose computers and digital media, favoring instead the use of digital
rights management. Id.
194. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 146, at 1409 n.256 (observing that "[i]f a levy is
charged on each device that can be used to download digital content, there will be a strong
incentive to use a single device that serves just that purpose... rather than to combine general-
purpose devices that serve other purposes as well but would require the payment of multiple
levies.").
195. For example, Professor Fisher's proposal requires periodic adjustments by a new branch
of the Copyright Office using sophisticated techniques to determine the appropriate rates and
distributions. FISHER, supra note 119, at 199-258. Professor Netanel's proposal requires that the
levy amount be determined (and periodically adjusted) through negotiations between associations
representing the industries upon which the levy is imposed and associations representing holders
of rights in different categories of works. In the absence of agreement, a Copyright Office
tribunal would set the rates. Netanel, Impose, supra note 118, at 44.
196. See ROBERT P. MERGES, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 508, COMPULSORY LICENSING V.
THE THREE "GOLDEN OLDIES" PROPERTY RIGHTS, CONTRACTS, AND MARKETS, Jan. 15, 2004,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-508es.html (arguing against compulsory licensing in favor of
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Compulsory levy systems are likely to prove less flexible over time
than solutions emerging naturally through competition. Like copyright
abandonment, levies face some path dependence barriers, though they
offer alternative regulatory structures and sources of compensation for
copyright owners. 197 Moreover, the music industry has been noticeably
cool to such proposals.'98 Levies do, however, offer a significantly
more flexible regulatory scheme, and one more congenial to the studios,
than proposals based on a public utility model.
C. Public Utility
Under this model, the music system would be regulated, probably at
the federal level, in the same way as essential utilities like gas and
water. 99 The exact nature of the proposed regulation varies, 2°° but an
administrative agency might, among other things, control revenue
distribution, regulate prices and prevent price discrimination, prevent
industry consolidation, require equal treatment of all webcasters by
record companies, and require online distributors to acquire content
from multiple sources. 20' The utility model faces considerable
private negotiation); see also Yu, supra note 117, at 704-12 (discussing a compulsory licensing
regime). In response to this problem, Professor Lessig has suggested temporary imposition of an
alternative compensation scheme during the technological transition from physical storage to on-
demand, online delivery, leaving the current copyright system in place for future use once the
technology has settled down. LESSIG, supra note 74, at 302-03.
197. A voluntary levy system might avoid some of these disadvantages by trying levies out as
experimental business models rather than imposing them as the single comprehensive solution to
the file sharing problem. See infra notes 220-26 and accompanying text (discussing voluntary
licensing schemes).
198. See Elaine McArdle, Up on Downloading: HLS Professors Propose Solutions to Music
Industry Crisis, HARV. L. BULL., Summer 2004, at 18 (discussing proposals for the copyright
system, including the entertainment industry's approach).
199. See Berkman Center, Scenarios, supra note 183, at 103 (discussing the Utility Model
scenario).
200. The public utility regulatory model has changed in recent decades. Under the traditional
model, a federal administrative agency managed an industry sector using strategies that included
controls over the packages of services offered, prices, entry into the industry, and cross-
subsidization. Starting in the 1970's, this model was replaced with a more limited model in
which agencies encouraged firms to develop differently priced and featured service packages and
sought to stimulate competition within the industry by reducing restrictions on entry, requiring
"unbundling" of packages, and requiring interconnection services among competitors. FISHER,
supra note 119, at 174-76. Professor Fisher discusses the factors that make certain industries
targets of more active government control and argues that those factors might apply to the
entertainment industries. Id. at 177-86.
201. See Berkman Center, Scenarios, supra note 183, at 12-14 (discussing the Utility Model
Scenario); FISHER, supra note 119, at 186-96. Some proposals denominated by their creators as
"utility" models actually sound more like compulsory levies or blanket licenses. See e.g., David
Kusek, Music Like Water, FORBES.COM, Jan. 31, 2005,
http://www.forbes.com/columnists/free-forbes/2005/0131/042.html (arguing that music should be
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resistance to two notions which are implicit in its approach: (1) the
equation of access to sound recordings with access to essentials like
water and power, and (2) the insertion of government control into
artistic enterprises.
2
From a systems perspective, the utility model might, if managed
properly, balance the various interests involved in the music system.
However, administrative agencies are always subject to capture by the
regulated industries which would put that balance at risk. Oversight of
administrators might be required, adding additional superstructure to
what is bound to be a centralized, top-down, heavy-handed regulatory
scheme. Emergence would not be allowed to occur naturally; simple
rules would be exceedingly unlikely; creative disorder would be
minimized; and the likelihood of unanticipated consequences from
persistent governmental intervention maximized. Given the
predominant trend toward de-regulation of industries like the airline
industry, which are considerably' more critical to the public interest than
musical entertainment, the public utility model is an unlikely contender
in the regulatory sweepstakes. It is, to a large extent, inconsistent with
the inherent characteristics of complex systems. The public utility
model offers a regulatory mirror image of the pay-per-use model
favored by the music industry. It proposes a top-down, tightly
controlled system run by a government agency as compared to a top-
down, tightly controlled system run by a recording industry oligopoly.
D. Pay-per-use
This category comprises initiatives intended ultimately to produce the
pay-per-use version of the celestial jukebox. Recording industry control
springs from a combination of expanded copyright entitlements,
restrictive digital rights management complemented by contractual
restrictions on users and enforced by anti-circumvention laws,
technology mandates requiring that copy controls be built into consumer
technology and strict legal enforcement of all of the above against both
direct and secondary infringers. The combination would expand
copyright owners' power over works beyond the bounds permitted by
traditional copyright law, allowing control of and charges for every use
of a copyrighted work.2 °3
priced in the same manner as utilities).
202. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 180-81 (discussing obstacles in regulating online
entertainment).
203. The Clinton Administration promoted the pay-per-use model in an influential white
paper that proposed expanded intellectual property rights as a means of safeguarding the interests
of content owners sufficiently to encourage them to participate in the new online environment.
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The anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA)204 constituted a major step forward for the pay-
per-use model. While enforcement efforts to date primarily target
circumvention of restrictive DRM systems,2 °5 the DMCA also provides
the framework for business models like iTunes, offering legal recourse
against those who circumvent Apple's more permissive DRM
limitations.2 °6
Defunct legislative initiatives in the pay-per-use mold include the
Peer-to-Peer Privacy Prevention Act,20 7 a patently unwise measure that
would have immunized content owners who exercised electronic self-
help including direct interference with the computers of suspected
copiers, and the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
Act,20  which would have required copy control technologies in all
digital media devices. The most controversial recent initiative in this
vein is the "Induce" Act,2°9 which would drastically expand secondary
liability for copyright infringement in order to provide legal recourse
against providers of decentralized P2P technologies.
The pay-per-use model is inconsistent with most of the regulatory
guidelines for complex systems suggested above.210 It attempts to turn
the clock back, preserving dominant players in the old industry at the
See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) (explaining the Clinton Administration copyright
proposals). Professor Jessica Litman notes that most of the assumptions on which the white paper
was based have proved incorrect, including the assumption that the Internet would never develop
either infrastructure or worthwhile content unless copyright owners' interests were protected. See
Litman, supra note 192, at 3-4 (addressing government responses to the digital music
phenomenon).
204. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
205. See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming
the grant of an injunction to prevent a web site owner from posting movies on the website).
206. ITUNES WHITE PAPER, supra note 102, at 41.
207. H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2002).
208. S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2002).
209. The Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). The
bill pitted the recording industry against technology companies who feared that the bill would
vitiate the Supreme Court's pro-innovation holding in the Sony Betamax case and expose many
technology companies (other than file sharing companies) to liability. See John Borland, D.C.
Showdown Looms Over File Swapping, Oct. 7, 2004,
http://news.com.comD.D.+showdown+looms+over+file+swapping/2100-1025_3-5400128.html
(discussing the political debate surrounding the Induce Act). The act did not pass in the 2004
session (bill status for S. 2560 available at http://thomas.loc.gov) and legislative action in the
2005-2006 session of Congress may have been forestalled by the Supreme Court's explicit
adoption of an inducement standard in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125
S. Ct. 2764, 2780-83 (2005).
210. See supra Part III (describing the music system as a complex adaptive system).
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expense of the development of new business models. It promotes a
restrictive top-down system that would alter the existing balances
between innovation, incentives, and cultural sharing by shifting power
heavily in favor of copyright owners and crippling technological
innovation and semiotic democracy."' Technology mandates are a
particularly ill-advised invitation to path dependence which chill
innovation and commit society to technologies that may prove
inefficient or detrimental.
Pay-per-use would not only preclude future emergent solutions, it
could potentially destroy those that have already emerged. It has been
suggested, for example, that adoption of the Induce Act might outlaw
technologies including web browsers, CD burners and the iPod,21 2 not
only limiting users' ability to create and share music but also
obliterating Apple's business model, which relies on the combined sales
of the iPod device and online music downloads for profitability. Pay-
per-use does establish a simple rule for users-"pay for every use"-
though actual implementation of that rule in transactions may be
complicated.
Given the high concentration in the recording industry, the pay-
per-use model would produce a tightly controlled, ordered system.
While such a system may survive in the short term, it lacks flexibility
for the long term because it leaves no room for creative disorder. The
pay-per-use model would eliminate the freedoms which traditional
copyright preserved in the form of fair and personal uses. Over-
protection of individual works neglects the role they play in the larger
system as not only valuable outputs, but also essential inputs for later
creation. Since some potential creators will be unable to pay for every
access to prior works, elimination of fair and personal uses will
decrease the availability of inputs for the creative system as a whole.
Total control, if capable of achievement, will produce anything but a
system "at the edge of chaos." Rather, it substitutes the fist in the iron
glove for the nudging hand. Such complete control over music
distribution has never been permitted by the copyright regime or
necessary for the music industry to thrive. Nonetheless, much of the
music industry remains wedded to this model.
The recent history of the music system suggests that, even with the
interference of Congress, the industry may be unable to achieve
211. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 146, at 1387-89 (discussing adverse impacts on
innovation).
212. Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found. Will the Inducing Infringement Act Kill the iPod?,
(June 24, 2004), available at http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2004_06.php.
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complete control over the system. DRM schemes will be cracked
notwithstanding the imposition of stiff legal penalties. New business
models and technologies like P2P will emerge. Even drastic measures
like the Induce Act may not succeed in destroying unauthorized sharing
altogether. The fears, common several years ago, that the combination
of DRM, restrictive shrinkwrap contracts and anti-circumvention
sanctions would rapidly produce a pay-per-use universe have thus far
failed to materialize. The music system has proven remarkably resilient
in the face of technological change and resistant to attempts to impose
complete control over distribution. Such resistance may be intrinsic to
the system. Complex systems inevitably contain too many variables to
be completely controlled. Even complex adaptive systems, though, can
lose flexibility over time and over-regulation may hamper them.
Pursuit of the pay-per-use model might distort the natural course of
system evolution, producing unwanted consequences along the way.
Restrictive regulation might cripple innovation to such an extent that
society is deprived of unexpected benefits it would have otherwise
enjoyed, including the development of lucrative new markets. The
markets for videotape sales and rentals would not have developed, for
example, if the copyright industries had succeeded in banning the
VCR.213  The commanding position of the United States in the global
information economy might be jeopardized. If Congress restricts
technological innovation at the behest of United States copyright
owners, technology developers in other countries may take advantage of
our withdrawal, and American developers may simply move their
operations offshore. t 4 While the United States may use treaties and
conventions to ward off those effects, such a cumbersome strategy is
likely to be of only limited effectiveness.2 5
213. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 146, at 1387-89 (observing that economic evidence
indicates that the unexpected "spillover" effects of new technologies often exceed their
immediate value).
214. For example, Sharman Networks, one of the primary providers of file sharing software
(KaZaA), is an Australian company, incorporated in Vanuatu, which operates globally. Yu,
supra note 117, at 19. The company currently faces copyright infringement charges in both the
U.S. and Australia. Mike Corder, Kazaa's Next Field Of Battle: Australia; The Maker Of The
Popular File-Sharing Software Is Being Sued There By The Recording Industry, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Nov. 26, 2004, at D03.
215. The U.S. has been an active supporter of protectionist initiatives in the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) which has produced several treaties protecting copyright owners.
WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, available at
http:/lwww.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/index.html; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
Dec. 20, 1996, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/index.html. However, in
response to pressure from less developed countries, WIPO has recently signaled that it may take a
more balanced approach to IP protection. Press Release 396, WIPO, Member States Agree to
20051
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
High protectionists argue that expanding copyright entitlements and
strong enforcement have historically worked to maximize creation and
dissemination and will continue to do so. For example, Paul Goldstein,
in Copyright's Highway, states:
The digital future is the next, and perhaps ultimate, phase in
copyright's long trajectory .... The main challenge will be to keep
this trajectory clear of the buffets of protectionism and true to
copyright's historic logic that the best prescription for connecting
authors to their audiences is to extend rights into every comer where
.... 216
consumers derive value from literary and artistic works.
There is little empirical evidence that stronger rights produce more
incentives to creation.217 Moreover, reliance on "copyright's historic
logic" is linear thinking. Complexity theory teaches, to the contrary,
that complex systems may follow unpredictable, bifurcating
trajectories. 18  Copyright law's past trajectory toward expanded
property rights, while favored by path dependence, is not necessarily the
best path for the regime in the new digital environment. The regime
may have reached a bifurcation point at which its path, while building
on the past, will diverge into new territory. File sharing, artist-direct
distribution and other new business models may prove to be better
adaptive strategies for the music system than pay-per-use and the
copyright regime may be capable of adaptation to those strategies.219
Certainly, a wide variety of new business models and moderate
regulatory measures have been proposed which offer hope that both
systems can be nudged toward a healthy balance.
E. Experiments and Speed Bumps
This category encompasses a number of proposals recommending
either new, voluntary business models, referred to herein as
"experiments," or new legal and technological enforcement
mechanisms, referred to herein as "speed bumps." They have two
Further Examine Proposal on Development, (Oct. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2004/wipo-pr_2004_396.html. See also Yu, supra note
117, at 26-32 (describing the international challenges faced by the U.S. in its attempts to regulate
file sharing).
216. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 216 (rev. ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2003).
217. See supra Part Ill (discussing the music system as a complex adaptive system that has
not yet been significantly studied).
218. See supra Part II.B (defining complex systems as nonlinear in nature).
219. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 192, at 26-27 (suggesting that peer-to-peer sharing is a
more efficient distribution method than the traditional distribution chains and should be
encouraged (within limits) rather than criminalized).
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premises in common: (1) their proponents anticipate multiple
approaches to regulation of the music system, and (2) they presume that
while complete elimination of noncommercial file sharing is either
undesirable or unachievable, file sharing must be kept within bounds in
order to secure incentives for creators.
Different proponents have formulated a variety of experimental
models. Professor William Fisher proposes a voluntary entertainment
cooperative as an alternative to compulsory levies. 2 0  The cooperative
would collect subscription fees from users through internet service
providers and then distribute the fees to member copyright owners.
Those owners would then forego copyright infringement actions against
subscribers.22' Professor Jessica Litman adds the voluntary element of
an opt-out provision to an otherwise compulsory levy.222 However,
copyright owners who elected to opt-out of the levy would be limited to
a single DRM scheme to protect their works. 223 The Electronic Frontier
Foundation proposes a voluntary collective licensing scheme in which
music users would pay a low, monthly subscription fee to a music
industry collection society which would then redistribute the funds to
copyright owners. The fee would confer a blanket license on
subscribers immunizing them from infringement suits. 2 24 In an article
critical of compulsory levy proposals, Professor Robert Merges has
expressed a strong preference for voluntary collective licensing and
suggests that collective rights organizations are likely to emerge
naturally from the online market.25 Voluntary open licensing models,
226such as that provided by Creative Commons, are already in use.
220. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 252-58 (contrasting aspects of hypothetical
Entertainment Cooperative to the current copyright system).
221. Id.
222. Litman, supra note 192, at 38-42.
223. Id.
224. Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF"), A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective
Licensing of Music Filesharing, http://www.eff.org/share/?f=collective-lic-wp.html. The EFF
proposal applies principles already established under copyright law as to the licensing of
performance rights through collective rights societies like the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and the Society of European
Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC). The EFF proposes use of anonymous monitoring and
sampling techniques in order to determine the relative popularity of shared works and distribute
the pool of money accordingly. It also suggests that fees might be included in internet service
providers' charges or university student fees. The EFF would take the voluntary licensing route
first, then consider compulsory licensing if the music industry refused to participate voluntarily.
225. MERGES, supra note 196, at 10-11.
226. Open licensing, pioneered for open source software, allows the licensor to specify that
her works may be used freely for certain purposes, but not others. See Creative Commons,
http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/ (describing various kinds of open licenses offered by
Creative Commons).
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Several commentators have suggested experimental means by which
artists might directly extract or receive payments from users by, for
example, releasing only samples but withholding the full work until
payment is received (the ransom model), tipping, or using an honor
system.227
As a possible complement to these experimental schemes, some
commentators have proposed legal and technological "speed bumps."
These proposals would make file sharing more difficult and
enforcement more effective, not with the expectation of eliminating file
sharing altogether, but with the hope of keeping it within reasonable
bounds. The BMG CD and Apple's iTunes software offer examples of
DRM schemes expected to limit, but not eradicate, file sharing.
Professors Mark Lemley and Anthony Reese have proposed a dispute
resolution system which they anticipate would provide broader
enforcement of less drastic administrative sanctions against file sharers,
resulting in a greater deterrent effect.22' They indicate that such a
scheme might be used in conjunction with voluntary levies, selective
criminal enforcement, and new business models.229 Professor Charles
Nesson's "speed bumps" proposal envisions some combination of new
business models, digital rights management and electronic self-help,
enhanced legal penalties, and shifting of responsibility to internet
service providers to block file sharing. 20 The proposal aims to increase
users' incentives to engage in authorized downloading by making it
cheap and high quality, while decreasing the ease and quality of illegal
file sharing.23'
Both the experimental and speed bumps proposals assume that the
copyright regime will continue to govern the music system. As a
general rule, these proposals assume, probably rightly, that copyright
owners who do not join voluntary cooperatives or collective licensing
227. Yu, supra note 117, at 50-52.
228. Lemley & Reese, supra note 146, at 1410-25.
229. Id. The proposal rejects imposition of liability on facilitators of user infringement
because of its adverse impact on technological innovation. Id. The authors propose creation of a
streamlined, inexpensive system of direct administrative sanctions against users themselves that
the authors suggest would lower the costs of enforcement and increase the likelihood that file
sharers would actually be caught and punished. Id.
230. Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Slowing the Stream: Development of a Speed-
Bump Approach for Protecting New Releases in the Digital Media Environment, Apr. 16, 2004,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/Speedbumps/Speed-bumps-conference.html (Copy on file
with author). Nesson's proposal would allow copyright owners to use spoofing (flooding P2P
networks with bogus files) and interdiction (competitive downloading, which effectively blocks
access to a work) to prevent easy file sharing.
231. See McArdle, supra note 198, at 17-23 (describing both the Fisher and Nesson
proposals).
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organizations will continue to use DRM technologies and contractual
restrictions to protect their content. They accept, however, that DRM
technologies will regularly be circumvented, producing a "speed bump"
that may deter some, but not all, unauthorized copying.232
These proposals suggest that regulation of the music system may be
achieved not through a comprehensive, centralized administrative
regime, but rather through some combination of decentralized private
initiatives and moderate public mechanisms for copyright enforcement.
While a detailed critique of each proposal is well beyond the scope of
this paper, several observations, from a systems perspective, are
pertinent. Most of the proposals seek some balance between
technological innovation, economic incentives, and semiotic
democracy. None would cripple one subsystem of the music system to
preserve another, but most would impose certain constraints on some
subsystem(s) in order to achieve that balance. Because the proposals
accept speed bumps as an alternative to total control, the protection
offered to copyright owners would be, as it has been historically,
somewhat porous, allowing some free dissemination of works to the
public, while providing enough protection to preserve creators'
incentives. Some personal uses would continue much as they always
have, either illicitly or under license. Existing, successful business
models, like iTunes, would not be adversely affected.
Not all of the proposals produce simple rules for users, although
voluntary cooperatives and blanket licenses would simplify rules for
users by allowing them to opt out of copyright rules for most practical
purposes. Many proposals do recognize that there will be no one-size-
fits-all final solution to file sharing regulation, which accords with what
we know of the unpredictable dynamics of complex adaptive systems
and the necessity of patient monitoring over time as emergence occurs.
The proposals attempt to nudge the system toward desirable emergent
behaviors. New business models, DRM technologies, and enforcement
schemes will produce changes in the operation of the system, some of
them unforeseen, which may, in turn, require future adjustments. 233 The
232. The iTunes White Paper, for example, points out that FairPlay, Apple's digital rights
management system for iTunes, does not prevent the creation of unencrypted copies through CD
burning, ripping, compressing, or exploitation of the "analog hole" (that is, by making analog
copies of the sounds produced from a digital source). The study notes that, despite the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA, circumvention technologies remain available to users
and predicts that even if DMCA enforcement were more comprehensive illicit copying would
continue. The study suggests that DRM alone will not prevent piracy, but may supplement other
measures for controlling copying. ITUNES WHITE PAPER, supra note 102, at 41-44.
233. For example, an accelerated dispute resolution regime to resolve infringement suits might
prove to have unexpected procedural defects which would require correction, as did the Uniform
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multi-faceted approach might allow sufficient adaptive flexibility in the
system, dependent on the exact combination of measures implemented.
Purely voluntary models have few disadvantages from a systems
perspective.2 4 They add new options to the mix of emerging business
models and will stand or fall on their own merits, just as genetic
mutations are favored or discarded through natural selection. The music
industry, however, has given such proposals a less than enthusiastic
reception, which promises to keep them marginalized for the
foreseeable future. Speed bump proposals for enhanced enforcement
appear more likely to win industry approval.235 Some combination of
moderate DRM and enforcement schemes with new business models
offers the greatest hope, over time, of maintaining an appropriate
balance among the interests of users, content owners, distributors, and
technology providers.
In summary, each of the proposed models for regulation of the music
system has advantages and disadvantages from a systems perspective.
Political realities seem likely to preclude adoption of the copyright
abandonment, compulsory levy, or public utility models. Most
proposed legislation follows the pay-per-use model, yet that model is
clearly at odds with what we know about the behavior of sustainable
complex systems. The most suitable form of regulation appears to lie in
some combination of new business models, public regulation through
law, and private regulation through technology.
All of the proposed models assume that legislative intervention is
necessary now or in the near future. Consequently, they fail to allow
the system time to adapt to its new environment. Yet, as previously
noted, there is little empirical evidence to date that the music system as
a whole has abandoned equipoise for chaos or even that the recording
industry is eminently threatened by P2P.236 Rather, there is considerable
evidence that the system is responding to P2P by generating new,
successful business models that given time, may replace illicit file
sharing.237 This evidence suggests that the music system will, in time,
Dispute Resolution Procedure (UDRP) for resolving domain disputes. Lemley & Reese, supra
note 146, at 1412. Lemley and Reese note that the UDRP lacks such features as an administrative
appeal, a fair system for assigning panelists, and a penalty for overreaching by complainants, and
suggest that a system for infringement dispute resolution could be designed to avoid such
problems.
234. Peter Yu suggests, however, that collective licensing initiatives may present the same
practical, administrative difficulties as compulsory levies and may prove more expensive than
anticipated. Yu, supra note 117, at 48.
235. McArdle, supra note 198, at 20-23.
236. See supra Part II.F (describing how complex systems balance at the edge of chaos).
237. The industry itself now estimates that legal online sales grew tenfold in 2004 and rapid
[Vol. 37
Systems Perspective on File Sharing
adapt itself to the digital environment without the necessity of
legislative action. While intriguing, and often elegant, the proposals for
substantial regulatory reform are simply premature.
VI. THE WAIT-AND-SEE ALTERNATIVE
This Part proposes that, rather than imposing one of the models
discussed in Part V above, Congress should let the music system run
under its current regulatory configuration for approximately three more
years. During that period, independent observers should monitor
conditions in the system and Congress should make only minor
adjustments intended to set system conditions to encourage beneficial
emergent patterns.
As a general rule, legal regulation of behavior should be a last resort
used only when technology and social norms fail to produce a desired
result.238  In the case of file sharing, social norms and technology
produced the undesirable, and illegal, result of widespread,
uncompensated copying. The growth of iTunes and its emulators,
however, suggests that norms and technology may be converging in
support of the current legal rules.239 The apparent dissonance between
social norms and copyright law is new only in terms of the increased
scale of unauthorized sharing. If moderate DRM schemes, consumer
education, and the sheer market attractiveness of legal online services
and portable devices like the iPod can reduce the scale of unauthorized
sharing, significant legal intervention may be unnecessary.
The many regulatory proposals discussed in Part V may be solutions
in search of a problem, springing from the unproven intuition that file
sharing must surely cause a decline in sales which must, in turn, cause a
decline in production. This, like most human intuitions, is linear,
assuming simple cause and effect relationships which often do not
growth is expected to continue in 2005. See International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry, IFP:05, Digital Music Report, at 3, http://www.ifpi.org/site-contentlibrary/digital-
music-report-2005.pdf (reporting that, in 2004, the number of legal music sites quadrupled, the
available music catalog doubled, and consumer attitudes became more favorable toward buying
music from legal sites). The report notes that record companies received significant revenues
from digital sales in 2004 and projected that those revenues could rise to as much as 25% of total
revenues over the next 5 years. That such optimism proceeds from a recording industry
association is encouraging. A recent survey concludes that nearly half of American downloaders
over the age of twelve now pay for downloads, a doubling of the estimate made only one year
previously. Press Release, Ipsos Group, Popularity of Fee-based Music Downloading Takes Off
(Feb. 10, 2005), http://www.ipsos-na.comlnews/pressrelease.cfm?id=2550.
238. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 490-91 (explaining the advantage of physical control over
behavior as opposed to legal regulation).
239. See supra Part III.D (explaining the emergence of P2P technology and the resulting
uses).
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prevail in complex adaptive systems. Intuition indicates that law must
respond quickly to match the accelerating pace of technological change.
Complexity theory suggests, counterintuitively, that law's slowness to
respond is a good adaptive strategy because it permits emergence to
occur.
While sound recordings were in common use by the early twentieth
century, they were not copyright-protected until 1972, 240 with no
apparent ill effects on the growth of the recording industry or, for that
matter, on related industries like broadcast radio. If, as the copyright
industries hoped, Congress had effectively quashed all forms of digital
copying with the DMCA, P2P might never have emerged. If lawsuits or
legislation had quickly and effectively killed P2P, the iTunes business
model might never have emerged. Delay provided the window of
opportunity for these potentially beneficial developments.
Napster exploded on the scene in 199924 and was finally shut down
in 2001, at which point the new generation of decentralized P2P
networks blossomed. 242 In total, P2P has only been working through the
system for five years, a very short time for a complex system to adapt to
a major technological change. Even so, the system took a mere three
years to produce an effective response to P2P in the form of the iTunes
business model. There is no reason not to allow that business model an
additional three years to show whether popular, easy to use, high
quality, legal online services can significantly cut the demand for illicit
P2P. The new model need not entirely eradicate unauthorized file
sharing, but must merely reduce it to levels which, in combination with
the new markets being opened, assure sufficient incentives for the
production of sound recordings.243
240. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 5, 19, 20, 26, 101 (2000)).
241. Napster, BMG in Music Pact - Facts About Napster, CNNMoney, Oct. 31, 2000,
http://money.cnn.com/2000/l0/31/bizbuzz/napster/.
242. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding
preliminary injunction based on finding that Napster was likely to be found guilty of both
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement).
243. As the Ninth Circuit observed:
The introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old markets, and
particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold through well-established
distribution mechanisms. Yet, history has shown that time and market forces often
provide equilibrium in balancing interests, whether the new technology be a player
piano, a copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal computer, a karaoke
machine or an MP3 player.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
[Vol. 37
Systems Perspective on File Sharing
During the three-year wait-and-see period, Congress, with the
assistance of independent observers,2" should monitor the state of the
system and make minor legal adjustments only if necessary to nudge the
system toward conditions conducive to emergence. While little hard
data currently exists about the state of the system as a whole, surely the
most significant condition that must be maintained is open competition.
Just as competition among species in the same ecological niche
produces evolutionary adaptation, competition in online music
distribution is essential if the system is to produce new, sustainable
business forms. Competition in the music system is a factor in two
related areas: (1) direct market competition among online music
distributors, and (2) competition in DRM development.
At the moment, the legal online market is competitive.2 45  It
encompasses a large number of would-be distributors 46 and the
availability of free P2P networks forces those distributors to offer
features that entice users away from P2P. Nonetheless, Apple controls a
large percentage of the legal download market as a result of the
popularity of the iPod,247 which dominates the market for digital music
players, though many competitors have recently introduced
alternatives.2 48 While the markets are so new that competitors may
make inroads into Apple's current lead, careful antitrust monitoring to
ensure competition will be crucial in the transition from offline to online
music delivery. As long as the legitimate markets remain competitive,
even if the P2P anti-market ultimately dwindles, consumers will retain
244. Congress should make use of independent survey organizations, including university
research organizations, many of which have already produced surveys on narrower file sharing
topics.
245. However, if the major recording studios, which control the offline markets, also take over
the online markets, competition will suffer. The offline music distribution system has become
significantly less competitive in recent years as mergers reduced the industry to four key players.
See Reuters, EU Approves Sony-Bertelsmann Music Tie-Up, July 19, 2004,
http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5275405.html (indicating the four major studios are now
Vivendi Universal, Sony-BMG, Warner, and EMI). Price fixing on CDs may have been standard
practice. An antitrust case alleging CD price-fixing by the majors and their retail outlets was
settled. See In re: Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation Settlement,
available at http://www.musiccdsettlement.com/english/default.htm, for documentation of the
settlement including the final judgment and order. The four major record labels recently became
the subject of a New York payola investigation. Jeff Leeds, Spitzer's List for Scrutiny Said to
Include Record Labels, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 2004, at Cl.
246. See mp3.com, Digital Music Services, http://www.mp3.com/tech/services-index.php
(providing a comparison chart of different music providers including MSN and Wal-Mart).
247. See Flynn, supra note 104 ("With 70 percent of the market for legal music downloads...
Apple's nearest competitors.., do not attract anything close [to] the traffic on the iTunes
network.").
248. See Marriott, supra note 104 (comparing music players from Rio, Creative, and Virgin
Electronics to the iPod).
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the power to reject unwanted limitations on their ability to make use of
recordings. Those limitations will be imposed through DRM supported
by license restrictions.
The DRM "arms race" should be allowed to continue during the
proposed interim period. Arms races are classic positive feedback loops
in which new technological developments by one side invite
developments by the other side, which in turn generate responses in a
continuous cycle that improves the sophistication of the technologies.249
Content owners may view such cycles as economically wasteful.
However, from a systems perspective, the positive feedback loop of the
DRM arms race produces two beneficial effects. It creates a negative
feedback effect that prevents content owners from gaining, or users
from eliminating, all control over distribution, keeping the system
balanced between extremes of total control and total chaos.250 The race
also produces more sophisticated, more flexible DRM systems, like
those introduced by Apple and BMG. While competition among
developers has, thus far, prevented the emergence of a uniform,
interoperable standard for music downloads and players, it has also
prevented complete dominance of the field by a single provider.
Online services currently employ a variety of non-interoperable,
proprietary DRM schemes. Proprietary schemes inhibit consumer use
by preventing portability among devices, imposing costs on both
consumers and competing technology providers.252 Given Apple's
dominant market position in the legal online market, its proprietary
standard creates entry barriers for competitors in the markets for
portable devices and music downloads.253
249. JERVIS, supra note 9, at 126.
250. See JERVIS, supra note 9, at 126 (noting the dual positive and negative feedback effects
of arms races in the international political context).
251. In a related development, Grouper Networks recently announced development of a file
sharing system that would limit sharing to relatively small groups of users and allow them to
share music by streaming each other's files without making permanent copies. Nick Wingfield,
New File-Swapping Software Limits Sharers to a Select Few, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2004, at B 1.
Such a system emulates some of the social and educational benefits of pre-digital mix-tape
sharing and its limited impact on copyright owners.
252. While some file formats, like the MP3 format available on most P2P services and the
Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) format used by iTunes, are open standards, they are incorporated
into proprietary DRM schemes such as iTunes FairPlay or Windows Media Audio. ITUNES
WHITE PAPER, supra note 102, at 44-47. The iPod will play MP3 or AAC formats but will not
play the Windows Media Audio (WMA) format used by most other legal download services.
Apple's FairPlay files can only be played on the iPod. WMA, the Microsoft standard used by
most other online services, is also proprietary but has been more freely licensed than FairPlay. Id.
at 11, 45.
253. See id. at 45-47 (noting that the proprietary format also supports price discrimination).
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Historically, digital markets display strong propensities toward
format standardization as the combined result of network effects and
efficiencies produced by interoperability. Like all systems markets,
they are prone to "tipping," a form of path dependence in which one
standard gains an initial edge in the market and consequently becomes
much more popular than its rivals.255 It seems likely that, in the next
few years, the market will converge on a single standard for online
delivery. If, in time, Apple both gains a market monopoly and controls
a proprietary standard, it may eventually have sufficient market power
to dictate more restrictive terms of use to consumers, including
abrogation of personal and fair uses.256
Open standards relieve some of the negative consequences of
network effects and should be encouraged. The voluntary creation of a
private standard setting organization, including all online music
providers, which could establish standards for interoperability of
devices and file formats in the download market, might avoid the ill
effects of an Apple monopoly. Private standards would evolve over
time through the natural workings of the market as technologies
improved, unlike mandated government standards that tend to fossilize
once adopted and whose bureaucratic enforcers are particularly prone to
capture. Apple currently appears disinclined to participate in any
254. Microsoft's dominance of the market for operating systems is the paradigm in the
software market. Its dominance resulted from network effects (as more and more users adopted
Windows, the more important it became for other users to adopt Windows in order to achieve
interoperability). Users who learned on the Windows interface were disinclined to switch to any
other interface, regardless of the technical advantages of the alternatives. Networks are, of course,
systems and network effects are a form of positive feedback, which challenges classical
economics' assumption of declining returns to scale. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479, 484 (1998). Lemley and
McGowan note an increasing returns effect in complementary goods; for example, developers
write more software for operating systems with larger user bases. Id. at 491-492. Complexity
economists formulated the theory of increasing returns (colloquially described as the principle
that "them that has, gets," wealth attracts more wealth), which provides an analytical explanation
for network effects. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 9, at 107-08 (describing the network effect
which contributed to America Online's early dominance of the market for internet service
providers).
255. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 254, at 496-97.
256. A competitor has filed a complaint against Apple in France alleging that Apple's refusal
to license its copy protection technology is anti-competitive. Ina Fried, Virgin: Apple's Not
Playing Fair with iPod, Aug. 5, 2004, http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5298642.html. Apple has
already unilaterally changed its terms of use, reducing the allowable number of playlist bums, but
increasing the number of computers on which downloads may be used. Markoff, supra note 103.
In the current market, consumers finding such a change unacceptable can seek a different online
distributor.
257. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 254, at 516-18 (discussing private standard setting
in networked markets) and 541-544 (discussing the drawbacks of government standard setting).
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such voluntary endeavor, but if its competitors do it sufficient damage
in the marketplace, it may eventually reverse course. Certainly, the
recording industry, in its licensing relationships with online distributors,
should encourage the use of open standards, which can only grow the
markets for its content.
In the absence of voluntary standard setting, reverse engineering258
should be permitted. Courts traditionally addressed the problem of
competition in software markets by allowing reverse engineering for the
limited purpose of achieving interoperability. Since products
compatible with the industry standard could, as a result, be produced by
a variety of competitors, the markets benefited from network effects,
interoperability, and competition.259 The key reverse engineering
cases 260 were, however, decided prior to adoption of the DMCA. 26' It is
unclear whether the narrow reverse engineering exception of the DMCA
permits reverse engineering of DRM to allow different devices to gain
access to music files.26 2 Congress should clarify the DMCA to permit
258. Reverse engineering is the process of taking a competitor's finished product and taking it
apart, working backward to determine how it was made. Id. at 524.
259. Id. at 525-26.
260. See, e.g., Sega Enterprises, Inc. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992)
(establishing that reverse engineering of software constitutes fair use where it is the only way to
gain access to unprotected ideas and functional elements of the program for a legitimate purpose
such as achieving interoperability).
261. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
262. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000)(allowing circumvention of copy control technology "for
the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to
achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs").
The iTunes White Paper suggests that the DMCA's reverse engineering exemption is unlikely to
apply to attempts to produce compatible players because music files may not qualify as
"computer programs." ITUNES WHrrE PAPER, supra note 102, at 45. In Sega and following
cases, the reverse engineering defense encompassed attempts to make programs interoperable
with particular hardware. See, e.g., Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix, 203 F.3d
596, 609 (9th Cir. 2000) (permitting reverse engineering for purposes of allowing video games to
be played on computer rather than game console). Courts have recently refused to use the
DMCA to preclude reverse engineering for purposes of hardware interoperability where software
was used merely as a lockout device to give hardware manufacturers control over essential
supplies. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 551 (6th Cir.
2004) (permitting reverse engineering to provide printer cartridge compatibility). Courts might
not reach such a result where DRM is used to protect copyrighted music files. A conflict has
already erupted between Apple and RealNetworks ("Real") over reverse engineering.
RealNetworks produced software, called Harmony, that allows Real users to play their downloads
on the iPod, as well as other devices. Real claimed that Apple is a monopolist in the market for
online music downloads and that Real was entitled to reverse engineer Apple's DRM to gain
device interoperability; Apple accused Real of hacking its proprietary system. Laurie J. Flynn,
Apple Attacks RealNetworks Plan to Sell Songs for iPod, N.Y.TIMES, July 30, 2004, at C3. Apple
subsequently altered its iPod software to prevent some iPods from playing songs purchased from
Real. John Borland, Apple Fights RealNetworks' "Hacker Tactics," C/NET NEWS.COM, Dec.
14, 2004, http://news.com.comApple+fights+RealNetworks+hacker+tactics/2100-1027_3-
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such reverse engineering in order to assure continued competition in
online music distribution.263
Recent market developments suggest that as long as the music
distribution system remains competitive, market demand will assure
preservation of a reasonable degree of personal use. Thus,
encouragement of competition through antitrust monitoring, open
standards, and allowance of reverse engineering to assure
interoperability will also safeguard personal use. If those measures fail,
more specific protections for users may become essential. Personal use,
in some form, might be explicitly protected by specific amendment to
the Copyright Act,264 or by judicial acknowledgement that it is implicitly
protected under the Copyright Clause.265 Alternatively, courts might
interpret fair use more broadly to include noncommercial, personal uses
or Congress might amend the DMCA to allow enforcement only where
the anti-circumvention technology permits reasonable personal uses.
Such measures might be part of legislative strategies to be implemented
if, in the interim period, empirical study supports the recording
industry's claims that the music system has fallen out of balance and
legislative intervention is necessary to preserve the incentives loop.
A thorough system analysis would provide empirical support, or
refutation, of those claims. To date, no one has undertaken analysis of
the music system as a whole. Such an analysis, by an independent entity
or entities, would document the components of the system, its inputs
and outputs and the channels through which recordings, information and
money flow, and make some attempt to quantify the level of activities
within each channel and throughout the system. Ideally, analysts should
compare the state of the system at different points on its recent time
line, perhaps on an annual basis since just prior to the Napster
explosion. One suspects the data would reveal that, in response to new
technologies, the system has simply begun to cut new channels for
music production and distribution, some of which bypass the recording
studios.
5490604.html. In this situation, Real actually seeks access to Apple's device, not its music files.
263. The references in 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) to "enabling interoperability of an independently
created computer program with other programs" might, for example, be expanded to include "or
enabling playback of lawfully obtained copyrighted works on portable playback devices."
264. I suggested such a measure several years ago when the implementation of the pay-per-
use model seemed imminent. See Tussey, supra note 166, at 1183-89 (suggesting federal
adoption of a limited personal use privilege). I now suggest it only as a fall back position if
market competition fails to produce the desired effects.
265. Patterson & Thomas, supra note 166, at 512-13.
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The analysis should address broader questions as well as seeking
verification that illegal downloads substitute for industry sales. What
other factors might contribute to the rise and fall of music industry
revenues? Are artists' livelihoods threatened? Surely analysts could
measure whether self-identified recording artists and composers are
abandoning their professions or whether their incomes are falling.
Surveys can query artists directly about the impact of file sharing on
their incentives.266 Data from the recording industry, independent
labels, and other producers should indicate whether more or fewer
sound recordings are being produced and whether more or fewer offline
and online sales are occurring, not only in industry channels, but in the
new channels being cut directly between artists and consumers.
Some of the studios' revenues may have simply been redirected,
rather than lost to the system as a whole. Growing licensing revenues
from online services may counterbalance losses in direct sales and
preserve the studios' profit margins. Analysis may reveal, as the
copyright abandonment school suggests, that monetary incentives are
unnecessary to sustain production of digital sound recordings. Or, to
the contrary, it may establish a clear link between file sharing and
substantial lost sales which causes the system as a whole to produce
fewer sound recordings. Such an analysis would be a daunting task, but
not necessarily an impossible one, and would provide a truer picture of
the health of the music system.
In the interim, copyright owners are not without legal and
technological recourse. They can continue to sue direct infringers,
enforce license restrictions, apply DRM, and rely on the DMCA to
prosecute circumvention aimed at content theft rather than device
interoperability. The Supreme Court has now adopted a more stringent
inducement standard which may enable successful prosecution of P2P
technology providers.267 These tools may yet prove to be sufficient to
preserve even the studios' incentives.
If, at the end of the suggested three years, analysis substantiates that
stronger measures are required, the empirical results, in conjunction
with the guidelines proposed above, would help legislators target and
266. A recent survey, for example, indicates that while most artists believe file sharing should
be illegal, the large majority do not consider it a major threat. Pew Internet & American Life
Project, Artists, Musicians, and the Internet, Dec. 5, 2004, at ii, http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/
PIPArtists.MusiciansReport.pdf. The survey also reports that most artists believe that the
Internet has made it possible for them to make more money.
267. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780-83
(2005) (holding that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting copyright
infringement by its use is liable for users' infringements).
[Vol. 37
Systems Perspective on File Sharing
frame legislation.268 Of the many regulatory models currently on the
table, some combination of voluntary experimentation with business
models and moderate technological and legal speed bumps is most
likely to nudge the system toward any necessary course correction while
producing the fewest unintended consequences.
Whatever measures they adopt, legislators should be prepared for
subsequent tinkering with the regulatory system as unexpected
consequences and emergent properties manifest themselves. New
technologies will come and go producing new responses within the
system, social norms will continue to change, new markets will develop
and old ones will disappear. The prospect of continued legislative
involvement is not entirely welcome in a copyright regime that is
notoriously subject to the influence of content owners.2 69 It is, however,
an inevitable adjunct of regulation of any complex adaptive system.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are several advantages to the approach to file sharing
regulation advocated in this article. First, it provides a framework
within which regulators must weigh policies favoring innovation and
semiotic democracy along with more traditional copyright concerns for
incentives, since technologies, socio-cultural practices, markets, and
legal regimes are all critical components of the music system.
Regulators must seek to preserve the health of the system as a whole.
Second, it counsels against the ad hoc, knee jerk legislative responses so
often evident in copyright legislation, which produce laws like the
Audio Home Recording Act,270 whose initial targets have long vanished,
but which remain on the books offering fodder for litigators seeking to
block new technologies. Third, it encourages high and low
protectionists to rethink extreme approaches and seek a middle ground
268. For example, if analysis shows that the settlements currently being reached between the
RIAA and individual file sharers are effective, Congress might establish an administrative dispute
resolution system and calibrate its penalties accordingly.
269. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35-69 (2001) (detailing the drafting
methodology for the various copyright revisions). Professor Litman did groundbreaking work on
the legislative history of the Copyright Act in a series of earlier articles. Jessica Litman,
Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989); The Exclusive
Right to Read, 13 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29 (1994); Revising Copyright Law for the
Information Age, 75 OR. L. REv. 19 (1996).
270. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000) (imposing a levy on digital audio recording media).
AHRA was designed to respond to digital audio tapes, a technology which was quickly replaced
by compact disks. The recording industry attempted, unsuccessfully, to use AHRA to prohibit
sales of the Rio, the early portable music player. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Rio music player did not
fall within AHRA).
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which balances order and chaos, stability and change, keeping the music
system poised at the edge of chaos where it is most sustainable.27'
Even if we view complexity theory as no more than a useful analogy,
the extension of the analogy to the music system suggests that Congress
should employ a holistic approach, exercise patience, and nudge the
system toward conditions that will foster emergence, preserve personal
use, and maintain flexibility in the face of future change. The music
system displays the characteristics of a complex adaptive system and its
recent pattern of emergent behaviors indicates that it is successfully
adapting to the digital environment. New legal regulations-
particularly those which propose drastic overhauls of the copyright
regime-are not immediately necessary. Leaving the system to run in
its current regulatory configuration for several years would allow
emergent business models, like iTunes, sufficient time to prove their
worth as competitors to P2P file sharing and would permit completion
of a thorough system analysis.
The lessons drawn from complexity theory generally counsel in favor
of a cautious regulatory approach and may apply to other classes of
copyrighted works since many copyright industries can be viewed as
complex systems for producing works. Application of these lessons
must be sensitive to context since the particular conditions in various
systems may differ and the impetus toward regulation may be more or
less urgent depending on those conditions.272 Unlike complex systems
which may directly threaten human welfare, copyright systems rarely
pose an immediate threat to lives or livelihoods and would-be regulators
should avail themselves of the luxury of time to observe each system. It
seems likely, moreover, that studies of different copyright industries
will reveal that, just as complex systems in general share certain
universal characteristics, copyright industries in particular share many
common traits and will often be amenable to regulation through broadly
applicable legal rules.
271. See Peter K.Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, Mich. St. U. C. of
L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Res. Paper No. 02-16, at 15-18, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=578575 (suggesting a systems approach to intellectual property issues).
272. There are significant differences, for example, between the structure, processes and
products of the music system and those of the movie system.
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